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1. Introduction 
1.1 Gold mining in Ghana 
Gold mining has a long history within West-Africa hence the practice is well embedded 
within the Ghanaian society and the practice of small-scale mining is well over 2,000 years 
old. Many studies have addressed small-scale mining in Ghana. The focal point of the present 
thesis is the practices and their implications of alluvial small-scale mining in two Ghanaian 
localities. As an addition to the existing literature, it will problematize two issues: categories 
and typologies defining ‘small-scale’ and the binary constructs of ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ as 
produced by the law. This thesis will exemplify how merely focusing on these constructs 
might cause blindness for other important nuances within the small-scale mining sector, such 
as the role of hybrid governors. Additionally, the notion of scale-making will be discussed 
and this thesis will illustrate how scales are created matters, rather than irrevocably existing 
entities (cf. Tsing 2000). How these notions relate to the small-scale mining sector will be 
elucidated in the following paragraph, but first it is important to address the historical 
embeddedness and ubiquity of gold mining in Ghana.  
 During the seventh and eighth century, Hilson (2002d) states – citing Dumett (1998) 
there were three main mining categories; alluvial, shallow pit and deep shaft. Alluvial was the 
most ubiquitous method and had been carried out by people of the Akan and Ashanti – two of 
Ghana’s ethnic-groups – for centuries. Alluvial gold is characterized by the fact that water 
has transported the mineral away from the gold-source and deposited it near a waterbody. 
Most miners extracting the gold were farmers who had taken on the job as a seasonal 
occupation during the dry season. However, the large demand coming from the Arabic 
traders called for a full-time work force and improved specialization. Moreover, during the 
fifteenth century Europeans also started showing interest in the golden grounds of Ghana – 
especially since the gold reserves on the European continent were running out. After the 
Portuguese had been in control of the gold trade for 150 years, their empire collapsed and in 
1642 the Dutch took over. The following years were characterized by a constant struggle 
between the Dutch and English for power over the gold monopoly which they had labeled 
‘the Gold Coast’ (ibid: 18). Ghana experienced its first gold rush in 1895, during which the 
country’s gold production increased with 400% (ibid: 21). A second gold rush followed 
between 1928 and 1929 after which the gold output remained rather stable over the following 
years, up until Ghana’s independence in 1957. Gold remains Ghana’s most important 
economic product (Hilson 2002d: 25) and since 1989 even the small-scale sector got 
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legalized. Before this formalization, the sector had been treated as informal, unmonitored and 
uncontrolled – all the while providing employment to thousands of people (Hilson 2001: 4). 
Additionally, the sector had been considered predominantly artisanal with little 
mechanization and which consequently only produced small quantities of gold (Teschner 
2012: 313). Yet after the legislation aimed to formalize the sector had put into place, the 
sector continued to develop and expand. This resulted into many licensed small-scale 
concessions throughout Ghana of which one in Ekorso.  
 
1.2 Introducing Ekorso 
During my fieldwork period I resided in Ekorso – a community with approximately 1500 
inhabitants. Ekorso was located in the Atiwa district in the Eastern Region of Ghana (see map 
1.1-3). It could be reached by the tar road passing through the community. Ekorso 
predominantly was a farming community, in which most of its inhabitants could foresee in 
their livelihoods by cultivating cash crops such as cacao. Additionally, the community also 
had a history with small-scale mining. For years non-licensed small-scale miners, coming 
from different parts of Ghana, came to the community to mine the precious mineral. They 
usually lived in houses of families that lived in Ekorso which consisted of several connected 
rooms with separate entrances, enabling them to rent one of those rooms. 
Map 1.1 Ghana’s Eastern Region (Google maps) 
Map 1.2 Ekorso’s location within the Eastern Region (Google maps) 
Map 1.3 Satellite image of Ekorso and the neighboring mining area (Google earth) 
 
Most people living in Ekorso belonged to the Akan, an ethnic group that inhabited most of 
Southern Ghana (van der Geest 1998: 452). The Akan were the largest ethnic group within 
Ghana (Abel et al. 2005: 113). The name Akan is an umbrella term which covers different 
sub-groups, such as the Asante, Akuapem and Akyem. Yet, all Akan are believed to have 
traced a common origin and thus to descend from the same region and ancestors. The 
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majority of the people in Ekorso belonged to Akan-Akyem and spoke the corresponding 
language of ‘Twi’. The Akan had their own belief system in which nature and ancestors are 
highly respected (van de Geest 1998; Abel et al. 2005). Moreover, they had a matrilineal 
kinship system and were dominantly virilocal – the latter was illustrated by my host family 
where, after establishing their relationship, my ‘host mother’ moved into the house of my 
‘host father’. The Akan tradition also left a very visual trace within Ekorso, with the Adinkra 
symbols1 engraved into chairs, painted on houses and woven into cloth. However, one of 
Ekorso’s elders elaborated on why the community – considered ‘Akan-land’ – nowadays was 
a place which harbors many ethnic-groups. He stated that the land which made up Ekorso 
used to belong to Akan’s. However, the forefathers of the current population of Ekorso sold 
certain land plots, which was why Ekorso turned into a mixture of land belonging to Akan-
Akyem’s, Krobo’s; an ethnic group originating from the coastal area and Ga’s from Greater-
Accra, Volta and Eastern Region. A remark on the difficulty of discussing these ethnic-
groups without their in-depth historical context is in place. Describing them as done above – 
alike some informants and ethnographic writings addressing these ethnic-groups – seems to 
imply that these groups are or have been spatially bounded. As elaborated by informants, the 
numerous ethnic-groups descended from the same spatial place, however this should not 
create the suggestion that they have lived in confined, isomorph places and unitary groups 
ever since (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1992). In that light, the community of Ekorso should be 
regarded as both “a demarcated physical space and clusters of interaction” (ibid:8). Systems 
of land clearly illustrated the result of these constant interactions between the various ethnic-
groups. Before the land was sold, most plots used to be family land, entailing that ownership 
was acquired through kinship. Land would thus be inherited by the oldest of the family – a 
custom in which gender was of no influence. However, the elder elaborated that a significant 
amount of land had found its way to individual owners who do not always partake in the 
custom of inheritance. Nevertheless, the importance of the Akan influence in the procedures 
of land rights and other customs should not be underestimated for they are the first-comers of 
that area. Lentz (2005: 157) addresses the significant influence of first-comers compared to 
late-comers and stats the following: 
 
Claiming membership of the group of first-comers to an area is the most widespread strategy 
to legitimate land rights in West-Africa (…), since first-comers are believed to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Adinkra symbols were symbols that expressed a general truth, such as the ‘Gye Nyame’ symbol – commonly 
used throughout Ghana, which stands for the supremacy of God. 
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established special relationships with the spirits of the land. These pioneers and their 
descendants often allocate land to later immigrants, grant the right to build houses and bury 
their dead, and mediate in conflicts over territorial boundaries and land use.  
 
Consequently, despite Ekorso being different clusters of interactions with influences of 
different ethnic-groups, since the Akan were the first-comers their customs were prevailing. 
Hence the position of the chief remained of great importance in, inter alia, land related 
issues. Ekorso’s chief – or Abusua Panin in Twi – was the head of the community. His 
traditional positon was thoroughly embedded within Ghanaian society and protected by law. 
In Ekorso, the chief was supported by a group of male elders and the queenmother; a senior 
woman who had to keep an eye out for the social relations within the community. Chiefs in 
Ghana were seen as the spokesperson of the community, who articulated the community’s 
needs and priorities (Ubbink 2007: 127). Since most of Ghana’s land was so-called stool land 
– entailing that land was vested in a customary community – the chief decided on issues 
regarding land tenure. Additionally, according to Ubbink (2007), one of the chief’s tasks was 
to decide on matters concerning natural resource management, therefore he had to ensure that 
the land and nature belonging to the community was being preserved (ibid: 128). This 
evidently had large consequences for miners wanting to extract gold from Ekorso’s ground 
while without the permission of the chief, mining would be impossible. However, the way the 
chiefs and elders viewed gold and gold mining also showed large Akan influences. While 
most people in Ekorso were Christians and belonged to one of the six churches in the 
community, some – amongst whom the chief and elders – adhered to a mixed belief in which 
they combined Christian values and a more nature-based belief stemming from the Akan 
tradition. In this nature-based belief gold is regarded to have spirit-like nature, meaning it can 
come and disappear to its liking. Consequently, the chief and elders stated that they found it 
undesirable for women to enter the mine-site, especially women in their (early) adolescence. 
Their presence would chase away the gold and if women during their menstruation would 
come to the mine-site, the land would be spoiled. The chief mentioned that even men who do 
not wash themselves properly during their wives’ menstruation are a danger to the gold in the 
ground. To restore the quality of the land after it had been spoiled, every 40 days the 
landowner should sacrifice a sheep. The sheep should be partly consumed and partly 
distributed on the land. Additionally, libation should be performed with one bottle of 
schnapps resulting in a purified land. However, the two concession owners I often spoke with 
stated that they were Christians and therefore did not adhere to such beliefs. Another Akan-
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related belief which affected the mining activities was the so-called ‘taboo-day’. Every 
Tuesday was taboo-day in Ekorso and surrounding communities, meaning that no mining 
activities could take place. According to an informant, taboo day originated from the day on 
which the forefathers of the community fought for the land and this day and the prohibition to 
mine had to be respected. 
 
1.3 The study: contesting constructs 
Since the legalization of the sector in 1989, scholars have been able to turn to the law for a 
definition of ‘small-scale’. However, the law is not too extensive on what small-scale entails. 
It merely states that small-scale concessions have a maximum of 25 acres (Ferring et al. 
2016: 172). A concession larger than that is considered large-scale. Scholars have built upon 
this categorization and produced typologies based on ethnographic fieldwork. One of these 
typologies of small-scale mining in Ghana is provided by Hilson (2002c): 
 
Small-scale mining refers to operations of individual Ghanaians or organized groups of 
Ghanaians (4–8 individuals), or cooperative of 10 or more individuals, which are entirely 
financed by Ghanaian resources at certain limit, and carried out on full time basis using 
simple equipment and tools. 
 
Alike Hilson (2002c), other scholars have also illustrated that small-scale is mostly 
characterized by artisanal practices (Buxton 2013; Hentschel et al. 2002). While typologies as 
such are helpful when analyzing the small-scale mining sector, Ferring et al. (2016) have 
problematized these typologies, since the small-scale sector is much more heterogenic than 
most typologies seem to imply. Along these lines, this thesis illustrates this heterogeneity 
based on ethnographic data collected on two different small-scale mine-sites and their 
corresponding mining companies: Ekorso (Key Empire) and Asamama (ATK-mining, 
hereafter ATK) – located within a radius of five kilometers and alongside the river Birim. 
Both operations mine alluvial gold. Small-scale alluvial gold mining can be categorized into 
two different categories: shallow- and deep alluvial mining (Aryee et al. 2003: 134). As the 
typology suggests, shallow alluvial mining implies extracting gold from shallow gold-
deposits – often not exceeding a depth of three meters, while deep alluvial mining requires 
constructing pits with a depth of seven to twelve meters (ibid). Both Key Empire and ATK 
fell within the category of alluvial deep mining. The miners themselves, however, referred to 
their practice as surface mining. Exemplifying the sector’s heterogeneity by juxtaposing these 
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two small-scale sites problematizes the notion of scales and illustrates how ‘small-scale’ is 
not something which irrevocably exists within the world. Rather, this categorization and the 
typologies are created, respectively by law and by scholars. Since the sector is in a state of 
continuous change, this thesis will argue that scholars should be cautious after having defined 
‘small-scale’ for it should not create a certain scope in which one is blinded for other nuances 
within the sector.  
 Furthermore, opening up the conceptualizations regarding small-scale and 
acknowledging the heterogeneity (cf. Ferring et al. 2016) enables anthropologists to observe 
interesting articulations between different small-scale miners. Since the articulations 
addressed in this theses occurred within the same concession, they are rather forms of 
cohabitation. Both the various small-scale mining manifestations and different forms of 
cohabitation can (continue to) exist due to the implicitness of the law. The silences within the 
small-scale mining legislation allows for (non-state) actors to (re)install their own 
conventions regarding mining methods and the social structures of their concession and 
operation. Therefore, this thesis will concern itself with exemplifying how licit conventions 
by hybrid governors structure cohabitation forms. Besides addressing cohabitation forms 
between small-scale mining actors, this thesis will also address another form of cohabitation 
shaped by licit conventions: cohabitation between small-scale miners and landowners. 
 A second problematization this research will address concerns the binary 
categorization of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’. Likewise opening up the construct of ‘small-scale’, 
broadening our perspective on (il)legality also exposes nuances which otherwise will be 
missed when only focusing on the binary categorization as produced by the law. As 
mentioned previously, the variety in mining practices and the cohabitation forms can 
(continue to) exist due to the silences of the law and the conventions by hybrid governors. 
However, these conventions cannot be placed within the legislative framework and be 
classified as either legal or illegal. Therefore, this thesis argues that the notion of ‘licitness’ is 
a better fit: practices not definable as either legal or illegal – yet condoned by the actors 
involved. Thus this thesis will elaborate on the law’s effect for both its explicitness and its 
implicitness and what the subsequent licit conventions look like on two small-scale mine 
sites. Moreover, it will illustrate how the licit conventions of hybrid governors structure 
cohabitation forms through the notion of temporality: the sequence of mining activities when 
extracting the gold.  
 The following paragraph will discuss the fieldwork and reflect on methodological 
choices made before and during the research. The second chapter provides a theoretical 
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framework by which the ethnographic data will be analyzed addressing the notions of 
(il)legality, hybrid governance, licitness and forms of cohabitation. The third chapter will 
elucidate the legal perspective on small-scale mining and exemplify its room for licit 
conventions. Following, the fourth chapter provides a mine-site comparison through which 
the notions of hybrid governance, licitness and cohabitation between different small-scale 
miners is demonstrated. The fifth chapter addresses a different form of cohabitation; 
cohabitation between miners and landowners. This cohabitation form again illustrates how 
the licit practices on the studied small-scale mine-sites can only be understood in the light of 
temporality. Finally, chapter six elaborates on the main conclusions based on the research’s 
findings. 
 
1.4 Fieldwork in Ekorso: a word on methodology  
Before discussing methodology, a word on the process leading up to the fieldwork is in place 
for it helped shaping the research. This thesis bases itself on fieldwork conducted in January 
until April 2016 in two localities in the Eastern Region of Ghana: Ekorso and Asamama. 
Initial research ideas resulted into a research proposal with a focal point on the role of gender 
in the small-scale mining sector. This research would be conducted in co-operation with a 
Dutch NGO; which implemented their programs on small-scale mine-sites and worked 
towards fair-trade certification. Their upcoming program would include a gender component, 
hence the suggested collaboration. However, after several conversations with the NGO while 
in the Netherlands, there were still some uncertainties regarding our cooperation. Therefore, 
beginning of January while in Ghana I contacted them again which lead to a meeting at their 
main office in Accra. They explained how they had been working in Ekorso on both the 
mine-site – licensed by the small-scale mining company Key Empire – and for the people 
living and working in the community. During the meeting they agreed upon the collaboration, 
which would entail them providing me with information about the program implementation 
and the results of their base-line study they had conducted beforehand. Moreover, they would 
accompany me to Ekorso and help me with a proper introduction to the chief. A few days 
after the meeting we – one of the project managers of the NGO, a driver and me – left Accra 
and drove towards Ekorso, all in a four-wheel pickup truck. A reflection on this experience 
will follow – for it was an important and defining moment in my research. In Ekorso, the 
project manager introduced me to their contact person within the community: mister Asiedu. 
After hearing about my intentions of living in the community, he immediately suggested that 
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I would live with him, his wife and two daughters. Some acknowledgement has to be given to 
the role of mister Asidu. During my first few weeks of fieldwork, his hands-on approach 
towards supporting me in my research almost turned him into a research assistant. Starting 
with introducing me to Ekorso’s chiefs and the small-scale concession owner in Ekorso. Not 
to say I would not have met these individuals without mister Asidu’s help, but it definitely 
simplified things. After having been properly introduced to Key Empire it needed not much 
time to realize that the mine-site was rather gendered: it completely lacked the presence of 
women. Mister Asidu told me that there was another mine-site nearby where I would be 
ensured of meeting women that mined to provide a livelihood for themselves and their 
families. Thus, the next day we took a five-minute taxi drive to Asamama and walked to the 
concession of ATK-mining. Indeed, there were many women mining for gold. However, after 
some weeks I came to the conclusion that the collaboration between myself and the NGO was 
not as effective as I had hoped. Our communication had been poor and I never received the 
promised documents. Moreover, the gender component was harder to grasp than I initially 
prepared myself for. It was definitely present but more implicit than I expected and 
consequently, I started to drift away from my research proposal. This happened because 
before I could get to the implicit gender component, there were so many aspects of the sector 
I needed – and wanted – to understand first. Why do these small-scale mining sites look 
completely different? What are all these different people on the mine-site doing exactly? 
What mining methods are they using, and why? Partially, I was able to ask myself these 
questions due to the lack of my technical expertise about small-scale mining. On the other 
hand, this also called for cautiousness while there were only a few people with the proper 
technological knowledge: the concession owners. This implied some critical thinking, careful 
reflection and talking to other individuals to shine a light on matters from a different 
perspective – so I would not find myself simply taking on the terminology of the concession 
owners. These initial questions quickly resulted into questioning where to place the different 
activities of both mine-sites within the legal framework – and how to interpret their activities 
if they did not fit within that framework. Consequently, I decided to focus on these aspects of 
both concessions. However, since I resided in Ekorso, this was where I gathered most of my 
data – both within the spatial demarcated community and on its neighboring mine-site. 
Therefore, ATK’s concession in Asamama mainly served as a site with which I could 
validate the data I gathered in Ekorso, which resulted in a very effective site comparison. 
The heart of cultural anthropology is fieldwork based on participant observation 
“which hinges on the dynamic and contradictory synthesis of subjective insider and objective 
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outsider” (Robben and Sluka 2007: 1). Therefore, I knew that in order to conduct decent 
fieldwork as an ‘objective outsider’, I also needed to become an ‘insider’ This process 
certainly had its challenges. As mentioned previously, upon arriving in a four-wheel drive, it 
was hard to shake the NGO-persona of coming to work for the purpose of “the development” 
of the community. As Ferguson (1999) illustrated; anthropologists may find themselves in a 
situation where certain metanarratives – in Ferguson’s case the metanarrative of “modernity” 
– can become local tongue. I encountered the same in Ekorso where, after the community had 
hosted several NGO’s that had built school buildings and constructed water pumps – the 
NGO terminology and the expectations regarding their presence had become intermingled 
with the informants’ personal narratives. There have been several occasions that exemplified 
the latter and how some people in Ekorso subsequently interpreted my persona. Firstly, after 
a few days of being in Ekorso, the chief and elders wanted to show me where ‘my NGO’ was 
going to build the health clinic. Secondly during an interview with the same chief and elders 
they elaborated on the danger of mining in the area of Ekorso. When I asked them about 
possible solutions they stated that money and jobs could solve the problem, both had to be 
provided by either the government or NGO’s. Thirdly, when having organized a meeting with 
several landowners in which we discussed compensation, they all had similar narratives: they 
had been cheated by the mining company and wanted additional compensation money. 
Afterwards, the concession owner – one of my key informants – had overheard people talking 
about this particular meeting in which I, in name of the NGO, supposedly would determine if 
they landowners in the position of receiving additional compensation. It became clear that I 
had to re-define myself. It took some weeks in which I constantly emphasized my role as a 
mere student who was sent by her university to do research. Moreover, I have to 
acknowledge that it was extremely helpful to have a key-informant with a certain status and 
embeddedness within the community who often took the time to explain my position to other 
people. Additionally, by showing behavior which was non-conformant to the behavior of 
other people of “my NGO” – riding a bike, staying at a local house, eating their food and 
using the same toilets – quickly showed people how my role and purpose differed than what 
they intentionally had expected. This involvement, sine qua non for participant observation 
(Robben and Sluka 2007) – which in practice meant things such as sitting through hour-long 
church services in a language I could not understand every Sunday morning – significantly 
increased my embeddedness within the community and made it easier for people to open op 
to me. This trust and familiarity, which established itself during my fieldwork, enabled me to 
study Ekorso as a demarcated place and a cluster of interactions between people cohabiting 
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the same place (Ekorso) while at times in different spaces (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 8). 
There were informants living and working in the space of a small-scale licensee and company 
owner – connected to other small-scale concession owners through a national assembly; those 
within the space of small-scale miners – connected due to their mobility and ability to follow 
the gold; and people in the space of landowners – connected to a larger market through 
selling their cash-crops. These spaces created interesting articulations when coming together 
within the same field of small-scale mining. The recognition of these different imagined 
spaces was highly important for it helped my objective outsider’s position. 
Acknowledgement of these spaces helped me in seeing and reflecting on the wider context in 
which to place some of the narratives of my informants.  
Nevertheless, creating a communicative context within this complex field during and 
after re-defining my persona, was an ongoing learning process. Yet I cannot amplify enough 
how much the setting in which I was hosted contributed to this. There were three main 
reasons why the location of mister Asidu’s house largely benefited my process of becoming 
an insider. Firstly, the house was located alongside the road leading up to the mine-site, 
therefore I could watch (and greet) the miners going to and coming from the site. Secondly, 
mister Asidu’s wife was cook, who owned a small provision shop and sold her food. Every 
morning many people, especially miners, would pass by and buy her food. Finally, one of 
Ekorso’s three water pumps was right next to the house, therefore, I could witness a constant 
coming and going of people fetching water. Consequently, just as important, people living 
and working in Ekorso witnessed my presence, which created plenty of room for daily casual 
communication. Thus, those days on which I did not go to either one of the mine-sites could 
easily turn into a very effective fieldwork day by just sitting in front of the shop and having 
small, yet valuable, conversations with people living and working in Ekorso. However, an 
important remark is the fact that the language barrier was a rather difficult one to overcome. 
While English bought me quite a far, it cannot be ignored that lacking the ability to speak the 
local language often left me feeling inadequate to fully comprehend my surroundings. 
Especially when focusing on small-scale mining and farming; sectors that do not necessarily 
require a degree. Consequently, many informants did not speak English and casual 
conversations could therefore not move beyond the regular formal greetings – which was an 
absolute shame when walking around on one of the mine-sites. An obvious solution was to 
use a translator. Since those who were quite proficient in the English language were people 
with a prominent position within the community (concession owners or the assembly man – 
the political head), I had to be cautious in picking the right translator. Letting a concession 
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owner translate landowners in conversations on compensation would definitely influence the 
answers given by the landowners. However, since I had several willing translators, it ended 
up working out fine.  
 As mentioned previously, doing fieldwork is a constant learning process. Even after 
feeling haven obtained a certain embeddedness and finding informants who speak English, 
situations arose which showed me that language is not the only difficulty to overcome and 
consequently made me rethink parts of my research methods. As Malinowksi (2012: 48) 
pointed out, it is inevitable to overstep the boundaries of the local etiquette. I encountered 
such a situation after having organized a meeting with landowners to discuss compensation 
matters. The assembly man was willing to translate, which enabled me to talk to several 
landowners in one day and briefly map the general stories of different experiences. However, 
after these semi-structured interviews and discussing them with my key-informant, he posed 
the interesting question whether these people were actual landowners or if they were farmers 
who cultivated someone else’s land. It was suggested that I would go to one of my 
informants, of whom I knew to be a landowner, for verification. I figured that I could just run 
the list of names by him upon which he would tell me whether people were landowners or 
not. I ran into him while sitting outside with two other men living in Ekorso. We started 
talking and I asked him if he knew all those owning land. He said he did but as soon as I 
started mentioning names of the people who had attended the meeting, the mood changed. He 
seemed a little angry and eventually walked off. The following day I turned to my key-
informant and discussed the incident. He stated that the landowner might have been 
uncomfortable because he knew that people had presented themselves to me as landowners 
while in fact they were farmers, but he did not want to throw people under the bus. I 
immediately understood that I had offended an etiquette. Being in Ekorso had created the 
impression that most people were very open and often shared their emotions and stories 
publicly. However, this situation made me realize that even in a cultural setting as such, there 
obviously were matters which could better be discussed privately. Thereupon the next day I 
decided to meet up with the landowner at his house. I apologized for any uncomfortable 
feelings I might have caused and I quickly discover that within this private setting, he felt 
much less reluctant to let me in one this rather sensitive information.  
 Thus, in alignment with Robben and Sluka who stated that “success in fieldwork is 
more a function of personal ability than of previous training in specific techniques” (2012: 1), 
I surely benefited from certain personal traits. Yet fieldwork remained an ongoing learning 
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process which enabled me to develop myself as a “scientific instrument” with both research- 
and interpersonal relations skills (ibid: 6). 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The present chapter provides a theoretical framework by which the ethnographic data 
collected while doing fieldwork in the community and mine-site of Ekorso and Asamama 
will be analyzed. Firstly, it will elaborate on the heterogeneity of the small-scale sector and 
the notion of ‘scale-making’ (cf. Tsing 2000). Additionally, it will discuss hybrid governance 
in a small-scale mining context and subsequently on the production of ‘(il)legality’ and 
‘licitness’ (cf. Abraham and van Schendel 2005; Heyman 2013). Thereafter, along these 
lines, the chapter will elaborate on two different cohabitation forms – between different 
small-scale mining actors and between small-scale miners and landowners. The chapter will 
argue that both forms are structured by the implicitness of the law and the subsequent licit 
conventions implemented by hybrid governors.  
 
2.1 Producing (il)legality and authority 
Practices of small-scale mining in Ghana appeared in enormous variety. The wide range of, 
inter alia, exploration and extraction techniques, organization and labor intensity made 
Ferring et al. (2016) label the sector as ‘heterogenic’. Regulating such a heterogenic field 
might harbor some difficulties, however, the Ghanaian government has tried doing so ever 
since formalizing the sector in 1989. The accompanying legislation produced the dividing 
line between what was considered legal and illegal – respectively practices either conform or 
non-conform to the letter of the law. Through clauses incorporated in the law, the state 
established its subterranean sovereignty, entailing that miners had to be granted permission to 
access and extract gold from the subsoil. This permission was symbolized in a license, which 
therefore materialized the divide between legal and illegal mining. This license permitted 
miners to mine on a demarcated concession, ‘galamsey’ – the term used by many Ghanaians 
to refer to illegal miners – thus either mined on unlicensed land or on licensed land but 
without permission of the licensee. 
 While the state positioned itself as paramount authority – wanting to exercise 
sovereignty over the minerals in the subsoil – the Ghanaian state did recognize other 
authorities. The institution of chiefs – together with their traditional councils as established 
by customary law and usage, was guaranteed in the Ghanaian constitution (Ubbink 2007: 
129). However, the Minerals and Mining Act (2006), which regulated the small-scale mining 
sector, did not acknowledge any other non-state authorities within the small-scale mining 
sector. Despite this lack of lawful acknowledgement, the position of chiefs was deeply rooted 
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in the customs of Ghanaian communities. This often resulted into a situation in which ‘chiefs, 
as well as other state and non-state actors, engage in a constant struggle to establish and 
consolidate their authority, and to legitimize their governance actions’ (Geenen 2016: 6). 
Chiefs are, therefore, one of the hybrid governors influencing small-scale mining and whose 
influence on the sector has been studied by scholars. Other hybrid governors, such as 
transnational companies (TNC’s), have also been studied. Since TNC’s were only allowed to 
license large-scale concessions this research has focused on hybrid governance within a 
large-scale mining context, entailing large-scale concessions – often licensed by TNC’s – 
operating in a Ghanaian locality (Geenen 2016; Hentschel et al. 2002; Hilson 2001; Luning 
and Pijpers forthcoming 2017). These studies have shown how, despite the state nominating 
itself as sovereign authority, other non-state authorizers also implement and uphold certain 
conventions and regulations. However, hybrid governance in a small-scale mining context 
has not yet received the same amount of attention.  
 Scrutinizing the legislation on small-scale mining shows the many implicit clauses it 
incorporated. In trying to formalize the sector, the law contained several clauses on various 
aspects of mining, such as: applying for a license, environmental considerations (inter alia 
mercury use) and selling the mined minerals. However, some clauses were quite implicit and 
did not entail any guidelines regarding the execution of the clauses. It is therefore these 
hiatus’ of the law that allow for hybrid governors to (continue to) install their own 
conventions. Since hybrid governors within a small-scale setting have not yet been the focal 
point of many studies, a question which dawns and with which this thesis will concern itself 
is which actors have the intellectual, financial and authorial superiority within a small-scale 
mining context and can therefore impose their conventions onto others? The fact that 
sovereignty is not merely established at the level of the state has been acknowledged by Emel 
et al. (2011: 73), who state the following:  
 
Sovereignty is negotiated at the level of the global-nation scale, it is territorialized at the local 
scale. Thus, we must also keep attuned to the ways in which local populations living in the 
space of extraction are constantly interrupting state-capital projects . 
 
Thus, since sovereignty is territorialized at the local scale and because of the law’s 
implicitness, the conventions that filling those hiatus’ cannot be placed within the legislative 
framework and be classified as either legal or illegal. In their article on international crime, 
Abraham and van Schendel (2005) invite us to think about these binary categorizations. They 
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propose to discuss issues of legality without taking the state as a definite starting point. 
Moreover, they differentiate between what is produced by the state (‘legal’) and what people 
involved condone and consider to be legitimate (‘licit’). While studying illicitness, they add, 
one should not equate the state with law and order since illicit practices are an active part of 
any state. The idea that the state should not unquestionably be equated to law and order is 
endorsed by the presence of hybrid governances (Geenen 2016; Luning and Pijpers 
forthcoming 2017; Ubbik 2007). Moreover, Abraham and van Schendel (2005) point out that 
both law and crime develop through ongoing struggles over legitimacy, in which the 
dominant and ruling groups decide upon what is (il)legal. These struggles, however, have 
never resulted in a self-evident boundary between what is legal and what is not. Therefore, 
both licit and illicit practices coexisting in social life and being imbricated in state processes 
(ibid: 7). This resonates with Heyman’s (2013) call for viewing (il)legality not as states of 
being, but rather as processes or social-political projects, which are reproduced and changed 
over time. However, when researching the small-scale mining sector, it is inevitable to make 
certain generalizations. Therefore, some scholars have decided to limit themselves to the 
categories ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ when analyzing the mining practices they encountered during 
their research (Hilson 2001; Hilson 2002b; Ferring et al. 2016; Luning and Pijpers 
forthcoming 2017; Teschner 2012; Yakovleva 2006). However, “when we shift our 
nomenclature to the distinction between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’, we refer less to the letter of the 
law than to social perception of activities defined as criminal” (Abraham and van Schendel 
2005: 18). Thus, when doing so certain highly interesting nuances can be observed and 
analyzed which, when staying within the categories produced by the law, would be missed 
and left out. The following section will elaborate on the social structures which are being 
shaped by the licit conventions by hybrid governors. 
 
2.2 Sharing grounds: forms of cohabitation 
Gold mining is a practice that concerns utilizing plots of land. In Ghana a significant amount 
of land was so-called ‘stool-land’; meaning that land is vested in a stool or a customary 
community. Traditional authorities, who were considered to be custodians of stool-land, had 
the tendency to act as landlords (Ubbink 2007: 123). Consequently, it was highly unlikely 
that land plots were free of ownership claim – making forms of articulations and issues 
surrounding land tenure ubiquitous in the world of mining. Many studies have addressed 
various forms of articulations, such as articulations between miners and traditional authorities 
(Luning and Pijpers forthcoming 2017), articulations between large-scale miners and 
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community groups (Hilson 2002a; Li 2013) and articulations between large-scale mining 
companies and small-scale operators (Hilson 2002b; Luning and Pijpers forthcoming 2017; 
Teschner 2013). These articulations might result in land use competition and conflicts – of 
which innumerable have occurred in Ghana in recent years – (Hilson 2002b: 149) but they 
can also lead to a harmonious relationships and forms of ‘managed cohabitation’ agreements 
with a ‘cooperative partnership’ (Andrew 2003: 122).  
 When looking deeper into the literature addressing articulations and cohabitation 
forms between large- and small-scale operations, we find most scholars identifying the small-
scale miners who encroach onto the licensed concession as galamsey.. In Ghana this was a 
relevant and pervasive issue while, despite the possibility of getting licensed, 85 percent of 
small-scale gold miners operated without a license (Hilson and Potter 2003: 243). The reason 
for this significant number of non-licensed miners has mainly been attributed to the 
cumbersome and long registration process, filed with unreasonable and excessive paperwork 
(Teschner 2012: 309). Thus, many miners did not even consider getting registered due to 
these expensive, time consuming and bureaucratic procedures (Hilson and Potter 2003: 255). 
However, small-scale cannot be equated to galamsey since – despite being outnumbered by 
non-licensed miners – Ghana had numerous licensed small-scale operations. It is therefore 
remarkable that scholars thus far have not concerned themselves with articulations and 
cohabitation forms within the licensed small-scale sector. This might partially be due to the 
fact that the interpretation of ‘small-scale’ has been hard to grasp. The law namely only 
stipulates the concession size which makes it ‘small-scale’, but it does not incline a 
‘delineation of “artisanal” or “small-scale” operations’ (Ferring et al. 2016: 172). Scholars 
provide typologies based on their ethnographic findings. These typologies entail possible 
characteristics of ‘small-scale’, such as the amount of extracted ore, the methods used for 
prospecting, extracting and washing, and the mining population – those who mine and those 
trying to benefit from mining spin-offs. The latter often leads to small-scale becoming 
‘subsumed within an essentializing category of poverty-driven, labor-intensive activities 
undertaken by uneducated, iterant populations in rural of developing nations’ (Ferring et al. 
2016: 171). All the while, terminologies based on mining methods often resulted in scholars 
nominating the sector ‘artisanal and small-scale’ – referring to mining practices characterized 
by the use of rudimentary equipment tools. However, some scholars have acknowledged that 
while employing the term ‘artisanal and small-scale mining’ themselves, that it was merely a 
subset of the variety existing within the small-scale mining sector (Seccatore et al. 2014: 
663). Thus, while these different typologies are valuable and necessary for anthropological 
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research, some caution has to be taken while, according to Ferring et al (2016: 171) ‘current 
characterizations of small-scale mining [are] overly generalized’ and assumptions regarding 
miners and mining activities often ‘reflect an uncritical deployment of small-scale mining 
discourses that may or may not reflect what is happening in diverse mining contexts’ (ibid). 
This incongruence between certain characterizations and what is happening in diverse 
contexts party arises from Tsing’s (2000) notion of scale-making. In her study on different 
scales in a globalizing world, she states that we should bring scales up for discussion and 
acknowledge that scales are created and do not unquestionably and irrevocably exist. When 
referring to globalism, Tsing states that its ‘automatic association of particular scales with 
particular eras makes it very difficult to notice the details and idiosyncrasies of scale making 
– thus, the more reason to foreground this issue’ (ibid: 348). The same can be said about 
scales in mining. While the law provides two concrete scales: large- and small-scale, the 
reality is that the creation of these scales in different contexts is an ongoing process 
influenced by different actors on different levels; (political and traditional) authorities, (non-) 
licensed miners, the community etc. Consequently, and inevitably, neither categorizations nor 
typologies will ever fully cover the entire small-scale mining context. They, however, remain 
to be helpful tools for anthropological research but they should not lead to blinding us in 
seeing what ‘small-scale’ can be besides these categories produced by the law and the 
ethnographically based typologies. 
Thus, answering to the call of Ferring et al. (2016) for opening up the 
conceptualizations of small-scale mining combined with the notion of scale-making in the 
back of our minds, enables us to observe and analyze the diversity of manifestations, each 
having different organizational structures and employing different mining methods. These 
varieties could (continue to) exist due to the implicitness of the law and the subsequent role 
of hybrid governors and their licit conventions. These licit conventions, therefore, established 
and shaped the social interactions and cohabitation forms. How these small-scale cohabitation 
forms are shaped and managed, however, has never been studied. Nevertheless, articulations 
could not only be found between different miners. Most concessions usually consisted of 
several farming plots with different landowners cultivating their own square meters, which 
resulted in an intertwined relationship between agriculture and alluvial small-scale mining. 
These articulations resulted in an interesting dynamic of ownership claims. The law 
structures this relationship by obliging the licensee to pay compensation. However, the 
legislation on the matter left room for personal interpretations and the installment of 
conventions or reinforcement of traditional customs by hybrid governors. The law, namely, is 
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implicit about the exact proceedings. It does not address any specifics, such as the amount of 
money, how to assess what amount is reasonable or the timeframe in which the compensation 
ought to be paid. Thus, negotiating the details was left up to the mining company and the 
landowners. These proceedings illustrate the effects of the law through both its explicitness 
and its silences whereby the silences gave room to other actors – such as chiefs, elders and 
license holders – to capitalize on the situation and to become authorizers that reinforce local, 
or produce and uphold self-established conventions. Li (2003) has addressed the issue of 
compensation and how it was structured by ‘a logics of equivalence’: people deciding on 
what matters can be compensated based on quantifications and standardizations. She states 
that ‘a logic of equivalence enables companies to make the costs of mining activity appear 
commensurate with the benefits derived from compensation agreements’ (ibid: 30). These 
logics of equivalence that result in compensation-schemes can, however, never fully satisfy 
the different parties involved, since some matters are not considered quantifiable or because 
people used different criteria and calculations in determining the equivalence. They therefore 
might cause indifferences and conflicts. Li continues by saying that the disputes caused by 
compensation agreements can be resolved with technical and legal frameworks (2013: 26). 
Therefore, looking at the Ghanaian context in which the legal framework is implicit, dispute 
resolutions heavily relied on the technical framework. Thus, the one with the advanced 
technical knowledge had a privileged position and was able to act as an authorizer in the 
matter. This exemplifies Li’s acknowledgement in which she states that ‘compensation 
agreements can sidestep legal frameworks and exploit existing power asymmetries’ (ibid: 
31). Since the license holders were usually more knowledgeable in matters regarding mining, 
they could seize upon the knowledge gap that existed between them and the landowners or 
local chiefs and implement their own conventions. This illustrates how authorizers within the 
sector of small-scale mining did not necessarily have be actors that had obtained their 
authority due to their relation to the state or to chieftaincy, but actors that due to their 
involvement, connections and knowledge about the practice of mining are able to position 
themselves as local authorizers. However, analyzing how these small-scale mining 
authorizers operate and what their implemented conventions looked like in a small-scale 
mining context has not yet been studied before. Moreover, since conventions are highly 
influenced by individual knowledge and motives, different small-scale mining operations will 
implement different conventions. Therefore, juxtaposing two different small-scale mine-sites 
allows for a more in-depth analysis of local conventions by different hybrid governors. 
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3. Legal perspectives on small-scale mining 
The present chapter will elucidate the legal framework addressing small-scale mining. It will 
first give a brief historical outline regarding the implementation of the legislation serving to 
formalize the small-scale mining sector and the legal definition of ‘small-scale’. 
Subsequently, the chapter will elaborate on the rules and regulations presented by the legal 
documents and it will emphasize the implicitness of the law for these silences of the legal 
framework have great implications.  
 
3.1 Brief historical outline 
During the 1980s, the Ghanaian government wanted to improve the investment climate for 
the mining sector and did so by implementing the Minerals and Mining Law 1986 (PNDCL 
153). The passing of this law eventually also led to the decision of legalizing small-scale 
mining in 1989 (Hilson and Potter 2005: 107). The Minerals and Mining Law has been 
amended several times, but the most recent revision resulted into the Minerals and Mining 
Act, 2006. The decision to legalize small-scale mining was made after the realization that the 
Ghanaian state was losing potential income due to smuggling routes that small-scale miners 
were using to sell their produces (Hilson 2001: 4). The governments’ motive for eliminating 
the smuggling channels was to create a significant economical increase. Moreover, since the 
underprivileged part of society befitted mostly from informal industries such as gold mining, 
the decision to formalize the sector was also driven by the search for means to alleviate 
poverty. Thus, by legalizing small-scale mining, the policy makers had anticipated on 
creating economic opportunities for Ghanaians with a low income that would only be able to 
make small investments and had little starting capital. The small-scale mining sector would 
therefore be highly poverty-driven and characterized by its low level of technology (Ferring 
et al. 2016: 173). However, a lot has changed within the small-scale mining sector since the 
latest amendment in 2006. Many changes arose due to the fact that the sector had not only 
hailed people who were pushed into the sector driven by poverty but it also attracted 
individuals with a reasonable starting capital who could invest in machinery such as tipper 
trucks and excavators. These methods and technologies allowed for mining larger areas in a 
much more productive and profitable way than artisanal miners. When the law was 
implemented, the occurrence of such changes within the sector were not taken into 
consideration. However, these changed turned the small-scale sector in an even more 
heterogenic field (cf. Ferring et al. 2016) resulting in research and policy-makers failing to 
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address all the shifts which occur in different localities and in different small-scale mining 
context (ibid: 182). A subsequent, and important question to answer is what definition of 
‘small-scale’ is provided by the law and how it shapes the field. In search for an answer, we 
have to scrutinize the Minerals and Mining Act (2006). 
 
3.2 State rules and regulations 
One of the prime characteristics of small-scale mining was the concession size. The law 
stated that small-scale mining formally meant that the concession was no larger than 25 acres 
(Ferring et al. 2016: 172). Concessions larger than 25 acres were considered to be large-scale. 
Other characteristics of small-scale mining concerned the conditions that had to be met in 
order to become a license holder. One had to be Ghanaian, at least eighteen years of age and 
officially registered by the Minerals Commission (2006: section 83). If these individual 
requirements were met, one could start the procedures of obtaining a license. Possessing a 
license was the final characteristic of legal small-scale mining as defined by the minerals law: 
 
Despite a law to the contrary, a person shall not engage in or undertake a small scale 
 mining operation for a mineral unless there is in existence in respect of the mining 
 operation a licence granted by the Minister for Mines or by an officer authorized by the 
Minister (2006: section 82 (1)). 
 
Thus, to a certain extent the law illustrated what small-scale mining is (mining on an area 
below 25 acres), it clarifies who are allowed to mine, but it does not make any statements 
about how small-scale mining activities should be realized. The only comment concerning 
preferred methods could be found in section 93, which merely stated that the wining, mining 
and producing of minerals should be done ‘by an effective and efficient method and shall 
observe good mining practices, health and safety rules and pay due regard to the protection of 
the environment during mining operations’. Thus, the legal framework surrounding small-
scale mining in Ghana did not provide clear guidelines about regulations or practices and was 
rather implicit about many aspects regarding the sector. This situation allowed for an 
incredible range of mining manifestations which could (continue to) exist. Despite the 
inability of any categorization or typology to fully define the small-scale sector, the legal 
framework does shape the field and the articulations between the actors involved. The law is 
able to do so since it produces authority and legality. While mining for minerals concerns 
exploiting the subsoil, it is important to first identify who claims ownership of the subsoil – 
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and thereby the minerals – and thus, who has the final authority over the ground below 
surface. The Ghanaian law states the following: 
 
Every mineral in its natural state in, under or upon land in Ghana, rivers, streams, 
 water-courses throughout the country, the exclusive economic zone and an area  covered by 
the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the Republic and is vested in the 
President in trust for the people of Ghana (2006: section 1). 
 
This section clearly produces legal authority for the state – with the president as its formal 
head – regarding the subsoil of Ghana. Even though the Ghanaian minerals belong to the 
people of Ghana, the president exercises full ownership rights. However, the authorization 
hierarchy continues when the sovereign state and the president delegate the authorization 
over the subsoil rights: 
 
(...) the Minister on behalf of the President and on the recommendation of the Commission 
may negotiate, grant, revoke, suspend or renew mineral rights in accordance with this Act 
(2006: section 5(1)). 
 
It is the minister responsible for mines (2006: section 111) who received the authorization to 
grant licenses – allowing people to mine a designated area in Ghana. As mentioned 
previously, obtaining a license is one of the requirements when wanting to get involved in 
legal small-scale mining. Not possessing a license implies not having formal permission to 
mine and the mining activities would therefore be considered illegal. This ‘subterranean 
sovereignty’, or national sovereignty over mineral wealth (Luning and Pijpers forthcoming 
2017), in which all the minerals and other resources in the subsoil belong to the state is 
referred to as a public system. Not all countries and their legal frameworks allow for a public 
system, some legislation rather allows for a private system. When a nation operates under a 
private system, the landowner owns both the land up and under the topsoil. Therefore, 
individuals or companies interested in the resources underneath the ground have to negotiate 
with the landowner to come to an agreement (Emel et al. 2011). Ghana endorsed a public 
system, in which the state authorized individuals, granting them temporal rights to the 
subsoil. This system raises questions about the implications it has for the people living and 
working on the surface of the subsoil. The land suited for gold mining largely depends on 
access to water since there cannot be any gold mining without enough water to wash the 
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gravel and thereby extract the gold particles. Considering that settlements and subsequently 
agriculture also developed and centers itself near water bodies, it seems evident that one often 
encounters a direct link between agricultural- and (small-scale) mining. Therefore, before a 
concession is utilized for gold extraction, it usually functioned as farmland with different land 
plots owned by various landowners. As mentioned previously, landowners utilizing the 
surface often obtained their land rights through inheritance. They cultivate the land 
themselves, or have farmers working the land for them – producing crops for private 
consumption or to generate an income. The public system, therefore, creates an interesting 
dynamic between landowners – who cultivate and have ownership over the surface or topsoil 
of the land, and the licensee – holding the subsoil rights. Thus, the licensee and landowners 
cohabit the same plot of land, but their ownership claims refer to different strata. The law 
states the following about this situation of conflicting interests: 
 
Where land is required to secure the development or utilization of a mineral resource, the 
President may acquire the land or authorize its occupation and use under an applicable 
enactment for the time being in force (2006: section 2).  
 
Through this section, the law establishes the authority for the state to occupy a plot of land, 
including the topsoil, if the land is considered necessary for mining practices – despite any 
type of topsoil landownership already in place. The law, however, does not specify when land 
is required to secure the development or utilization of a mineral resource. It does not mention 
the requirements and who decides upon this necessity. Apparently land can transition from 
farmland into land that is required for the mining of minerals. A possible interpretation of this 
transition is that it takes place somewhere during the licensing process, since licensing a 
potential mining area can happen through two different pathways. The fist path starts with an 
aspiring licensee identifying an area of interest. That individual contacts the Minerals 
Commission to further identify whether this area can become a licensed concession. What 
follows are formalities; produced by the state and incorporated in the law that are required 
when embarking on the legalization or licensing process. The second pathway differs from 
the first one since it is not an individual submitting an area to the Minerals Commission but 
instead the Minerals Commission creating ‘designated areas’, that are then made “available to 
interested Ghanaians”2. Designated areas are further specified as “area[s] designated as a 
small scale mineral operation area by the Minister by a notice published in the Gazette” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  https://www.newsghana.com.gh/minerals-commission-debunks-gnassm-claims-over-issuance-of-licences/, 	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(Minerals and Mining Act 2006: section 111-1(d)). Thereupon, the applicant must follow the 
same legal formalities implemented by the government as the individual personally 
submitting an area.3 It is therefore likely that as soon as land is demarcated as a (potential) 
concession – either by private initiative or by designation by the Minerals Commission – it 
becomes “required to secure the development or utilization of a mineral resource” (ibid: 
section 2). This interpretation of the law section implies that landowners have no choice but 
to give up their land when the state decides upon regarding their land as required for minerals 
extraction and authorizes its occupation to licensee. When the paperwork has been finalized 
and the license is granted to “a person, a group of persons, a co-operative society or a 
company” (ibid: section 85(a)), the license is valid “for a period not more than five years 
from the date of issue in the first instance” (ibid) However, a mining operation often 
anticipates on working on a specific area for a longer time, especially since small-scale 
mining companies are legally allowed to work on a maximum of two small-scale concessions 
at the same time. They therefore sometimes have two – practically bordering – licensed 
concessions, making the mine-life of the entire mining operation exceed those initial five 
years. The law allows for a license extension but does not explicitly specify the exact 
extension period. The law states that the initial license “may be renewed on expiry for a 
further period that the Minister may determine” (ibid). An important acknowledgement 
deriving from this is that the transfer of ownership rights from a landowner to a licensee is 
not a definite or permanent property transfer. The ownership rights are legitimate for as long 
as the license is valid. When the license runs out the land has to be reclaimed and the 
ownership rights return to initial landowner. However, the law does not provide a time 
restriction in which is determined for what period the landowners have to give up their 
ownership rights. This results in many landowners pondering over the same question 
regarding when they can reclaim their land, without ever receiving a satisfying answer. This 
illustrates how the silence of the law structures the social interactions, since both parties – the 
licensee and the landowners – start their relationship with different hopes and expectations. 
Where the licensee is mainly focused on creating maximum profit for a period that allows the 
mining company to feel it fully utilized the area, the landowners feel they benefit most from 
regaining the land as soon as possible so they can resume cultivating the land and generate an 
income. To make the up for the temporal loss of ownership rights, the law obliges licensee to 
pay compensation: 
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Where a licence is granted in a designated area to a person other than the owner of the land, 
the licensee shall pay compensation for the use of the land and destruction of crops to the 
owner of the land that the Minister in consultation with the Commission and the Government 
agency with responsibility for valuation of public lands may prescribe (2006: section 94). 
 
The law does not specify the height of the compensation and it does not provide any further 
guidelines as to how the negotiations about the height should be carried out. Further 
procedures are left entirely to the licensee and the landowner. The law thus merely stipulates 
that the licensee ought to pay compensation for ‘the use of the land’ and ‘the destruction of 
the crops’. Paying for land use seems sensible and straightforward since in order to extract 
the gold, the licensee needs to reach the subsoil and obviously cannot do so without 
damaging the topsoil. Paying for the land would allow for standardized compensation prices 
– one acre would easily translate itself into a set monetary amount. However, the law does 
not provide such standardized rates, leaving room for licensee to hold on to their own prices. 
Moreover, as chapter five will illustrate, interpretations of actual land use differ through the 
implications of temporality. ‘Destruction of the crops’ can also be understood in various 
ways. The law does not specify which crops correspond to what prices and whether the price 
depends on the state of the crop at the moment of destruction or if it has to be considered 
what price the crop will eventually sell for on the market. It is therefore unclear what exactly 
is considered to be compensational: the crops as encountered by the licensee or the suffered 
loss of income. As Li (2013) illustrates with two cases considering compensation paid by 
mining companies for the used water resources in South-America – things are always made 
comparable and exchangeable, but it might not always be possible to make those things 
quantifiable, standardized and equivalent. The notion of ‘equivalence’ in the context of 
mining, as explained by Li, ‘make[s] it possible to reconcile different forms of value, such 
that, for example, the potential consequences of mining development can be offset with 
monetary compensation’ (2016: 19; 20). Therefore, the vagueness of the Ghanaian mining 
law about what can and what cannot be held compensational, leads to negotiations between 
land- and license owners in which they themselves decide upon equivalences. Due to the lack 
of legislative guidance these negotiations result into somewhat improvised compensation 
strategies. Whether these compensation strategies have full legal support might be debatable, 
but by no means could they be considered to be illegal, simply because the law does not 
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address the topic. This clearly illustrates how the law, by producing (il)legality, leaves 
significant room for licit conventions by hybrid governors. 
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4. Small-scale in different localities 
The present chapter will elucidate different small-scale mining practices of two mine-sites 
based on the ethnographic data collected at the concessions of Key Empire (Ekorso) and 
ATK-mining (Asamama). The emphasis will lie on Key Empire’s concession for it was 
situated within the community in which I resided. Firstly, an explanation of Key Empire as a 
company, its concession and their mining methods will be provided. Secondly, a similar 
explanation will be given regarding ATK-mining’s concession.  
 By juxtaposing the two mine-sites and making a comparison illustrates, the great 
diversity in manifestations of small-scale mining operations can be clearly illustrated. Along 
those lines, the comparison will show how narrow and pre-defined definitions of ‘small-
scale’ might result into missing certain important nuances within the sector. Moreover, 
through analyzing the two operations, the notions of (il)legality and (il)licitness will be 
discussed in the light of the conventions which are being upheld by the concession owners 
who function as hybrid governors. Especially how those conventions structure the 
cohabitation forms on the concession.  
 
4.1 Key Empire 
4.1.1 The story behind the company  
Key Empire is founded and run by its CEO Emmanuel. Emmanuel, a Ghanaian from a town 
in the Eastern region; around an hour drive up north from Accra, was in his early thirties and 
when asked about his occupation he said he usually referred to himself as entrepreneur. After 
graduating from the University of Ghana in Accra, he started several companies in export and 
software. In 2007 one of his friends from Abu Dhabi, whom he had met at University campus 
through activities Emmanuel participated in whilst being a student politician, approached him 
with a quite specific request. His friend needed one kilo of gold and figured that Emmanuel 
could help him with acquiring the desired amount. However, Emmanuel, by that time, had 
never seen gold before. This event, he said, marked the start of his “gold journey”. In his 
search for the precious mineral, Emmanuel traveled to several communities with prevalent 
mining activities. In one particular community, Obuasi, he spoke with non-licensed small-
scale miners who mined on the concession of the large-scale mining company AngloGold. He 
informed about the timeframe in which they thought they could mine a kilo of gold. They 
stated that it would take them around one to two months. Emmanuel ended up going to 
several sources to collect gold and an agreement between him and his friend from Abu Dhabi 
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was made, which entailed Emmanuel buying small quantities of gold with his own money, 
shipping it to Abu Dhabi, after which money would be transferred back to Emmanuel. After 
several shipments of smaller quantities, the gold would be melted together in Abu Dhabi. 
Within a couple of months, they achieved their goal and the final quantity of gold 
successfully reached the United Arab Emirates. Thereby the initial partnership ended but it 
had sparked Emmanuel’s enthusiasm and interest for the small-scale mining sector. He 
therefore decided to get informed and to do some research at the Minerals Commission and 
Natural Resources Ministry so he could, in his words, “be part of the business”. This 
“informal research” led to him wanting to acquire a licensed concession so he could start 
setting up his own mining operation. He started to identify an area; located around an hour 
drive from Ekorso. Whilst at the start of the process of getting licensed, he received yet 
another request from Abu Dhabi for an even larger amount of gold. However, since 
Emmanuel was investing his money into the expensive procedure of acquiring a licensed 
concession, the original payment system they had in place – in which Emmanuel paid for and 
shipped the gold before money would be transferred into his bank account – was not an 
option this time around. Therefore, the significant amount of money would be transferred to 
him all at once, but not without some form of collateral. After deciding what property would 
serve as collateral, formal documents were signed and as Emmanuel phrases it; “the ball 
started rolling”. Everything went according to plan, until the last kilo: “I got in touch with 
somebody who said can supply the kilo in a day. I guess maybe I was getting a bit greedy or 
so. And maybe I was also losing patience (…). Unfortunately, what they sold to me was 
copper and glass”. This scam got him in a very tight situation for he was running out of 
money. While it being an enormous setback, Emmanuel said it pushed him further into the 
sector. After he had contacted the men from Abu Dhabi to inform them about the situation 
and to request for some time to find a solution, they replied by saying that they had no time to 
wait and that he could always sell the property that functioned as collateral if he was in need 
of money. In the mean while he was seven months into the licensing process, which would 
expectedly take up to a year and a half in total. Feeling pressured and exploring his options, 
Emmanuel came up with a solution: “so I called my friend and said ‘look, I’ll see if I want to 
– I can do a galamsey’. I mean illegal mining”. The operation would be set up on the land 
that he was processing but which had not officially been licensed. His relations agreed upon 
the idea, therefore the next step was renting the right equipment and employing miners. They 
mined for around a month in which they were able to extract the final kilo. However, since 
there were still some days left before the equipment had to be returned, Emmanuel decided to 
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take advantage of the situation and keep on mining. He knew that what he was doing was not 
according to the law. He therefore contacted the Minerals Commission to enlighten them 
about his situation and the choices he had made: “I told him [an executive of the Minerals 
Commission] that I am actually processing [the land] but because of the situation I could not 
have waited. I told Minerals Commission my story, though unofficial, I mean the few people 
I know there. They told ‘me Emma, though it is illegal but the law really does not criminalize 
it (…) and so it is not really a problem as far as you are not destroying somebody’s crops and 
you [respect] the community’”. He therefore continued the non-licensed operation. The 
operation eventually expanded to a point where it could no longer be considered a small 
undertaking for Emmanuel employed around 250 people. Thus, what started as a temporary 
practice as a means to solve the scamming problem, turned into an active and producing non-
licensed operation that lasted for around six months. After six months the Minerals 
Commission granted him the license for the concession. Therewith, Emmanuel and his 
company acquired their first licensed concession in 2011. By that time Key Empire had 
already done some prospecting for the land in Ekorso. Therefore, Emmanuel decided to also 
start the process of licensing the land near Ekorso. The license was granted and since 2012 
Key Empire has been mining in Ekorso. Emmanuel’s vision for Key Empires new concession 
was different from what he had been doing so far. He wanted to have a more mechanized 
operation and move away from what is called ‘suagum’ in Twi, the local language (see figure 
1). Suagum translates itself into ‘carrying and depositing’ or ‘fetch and pour’ (Ferring et al. 
2016: 179).  
 
 
Fig. 1. Suagum with traditional washing plant on the concession of ATK-mining (picture by author) 
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Suagum is usually associated with galamsey and mostly relies on manpower since it is done 
using a traditional washing plant. Moreover, it requires little starting capital. Mechanizing the 
operation was preferred due to security reasons – which will be further elucidated when 
discussing ‘suagum’ in the paragraphs yet to come – and financial considerations. Emmanuel 
elaborates by stating that using the suagum method caused him to rely on quite some 
employees, whom in total received 1/3rd of the profit. Furthermore, deducting the rent of the 
equipment and the fuel left the company with little profit. Therefore, the mining methods 
used on the concession in Ekorso differ greatly from the methods the company had used thus 
far.  
 Emmanuel’s story about his involvement in the small-scale mining sector is 
interesting for several reasons. First of all, it confirms what Teschner states in his article, 
namely that “gold moves between registered and unregistered actors with ease” (2012: 309). 
When embarking on the partnership with his friend from Abu Dhabi, Emmanuel’s quest for 
gold led to him buying gold from non-licensed miners. This gold, therefore, was extracted 
‘illegally’ by ‘unregistered’ actors. However, after buying the gold, the gold was then shipped 
to the United Arab Emirates by a legal exporter. It shows how the “perceived dichotomy of 
formal and informal actors in the sector does not actually exist” (ibid: 308) but instead the 
supply chains are highly intertwined in a “semi-formal” chain (ibid: 309). This again invites 
us to rethink the categories of ‘legal-’ and ‘illegalization’. As Heyman (2013) states; thinking 
of (il)legalization as ‘processes’ instead of ‘states of being’, opens up room for asking 
questions related to the situation as previously described in which a commodity chain is not 
consistently legal or illegal. It therefore becomes essential to question the origination, 
implementation and reproduction of “particular sets of classifications [and] justifications” 
(Heyman 2013: 304) that are upheld by states, hybrid governances or scholars. Besides 
illustration how commodity chains go in and out of legality, this situation also illustrates how 
people and their companies can “weave in and out of legality” (Abraham and van Schendel 
2005: 9). Even though Emmanuel and his company eventually mined on a legal concession, 
they have a history as galamsey. Moreover, Emmanuel’s story also shows how even people 
working for the state on municipal level – executives of the Minerals Commission – 
acknowledge the non-existing binary categories of legal- and illegality by stating that mining 
without a license is illegal – since the law states that licenses should be obtained – though not 
criminalized. This implies that the law does not further stipulate the consequences of mining 
without possessing a license. This again problematizes the binary categories as produced by 
the law and employed by scholars. Furthermore, the statement of the executive of the 
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Minerals Commission, being part of the municipality, also invites us to rethink the role of the 
state regarding matters of legislation: 
 
 Another useful rethinking is to go beyond the dichotomization of state and nonstate to 
 recognize diversity and processuality of state activities and agents, likewise for the nonstate 
 side, and to look at interpenetration processes across the useful but limited state—nonstate 
 conceptual divide (ibid).  
 
Shifting away from the categories ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ enables us to see beyond those 
notions and to analyze the production of (il)legality. This importance is exemplified by the 
fact that, as mentioned previously, the production of (il)legality is not merely allotted to the 
state or other political non-state actors but also to non-political actors whom have acquired 
the position of regulators due to their superior knowledge in certain matters. This will be 
more explicitly illustrated in the following paragraph, which will show how a small-scale 
mining company also produces illicit regulations due the implicitness of the law and the 
acceptance of other actors involved. This aligns with one of arguments of Abraham and van 
Schendel (2005), namely that states should not be equated with law and order.  
 
4.1.2 The Ekorso concession 
Before Key Empire licensed the concession in Ekorso, the community had already 
experienced quite some mining practices in their surrounding areas. The non-licensed miners 
that were mining the area came from outside Ekorso. The miners were both digging pits and 
mining on the river Birim, where they extracted gravel4 from the riverbed. The latter is done 
using a mining method that is referred to as ‘dredging’ or, in local terms, ‘ChangFa’ – named 
after the engines it runs on. A dredge is a floating metal construction covered with wooden 
planks (see figure 2.1 and 2.2) which is kept floating by the empty plastic barrels attached to 
the bottom. The Changfa engines – which are located on one end of the dredge – pumps up 
water, which then enters the pressure hose. The function of this hose is to disturb the bottom 
of the pit that contains the gold. The gravel that has been loosened up is then sucked into the 
second hose. This second hose has a pyramid shaped construction attached to it, which serves 
as a drilling device (see figure 2.3). Fixed to the two hoses is a long metal bar. While the 
hoses disappear in the water to the bottom of the pit, the miners hold onto the metal bar and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The difference between gravel and soil depends on the particle size. The miners I spoke to all refer to the gold 
containing sediment as ‘gravel’. 
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rock it back and forth while standing on the dredge (see figure 2.1). This motion loosens the 
gravel inside the bottom of the pit so it can be sucked into the hose and onto the washing 
board – allocated on the dredge – where the soil is separated from the gold.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Two dredges in one of Key Empire’s old pits while loosening the bottom of the pit and extracting the 
gravel (picture by author) 
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Fig. 2.2 A dredge in one of Key Empire’s old pits (picture by author) 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Hoses attached to the engines (picture by author) 
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Dredging highly affects the environment for it alters the bedding of the water body and can 
therefore even redirect entire rivers. Since the Mining Act states that a small-scale operation 
should mine paying “regard to the protection of the environment during mining operations” 
(Minerals and Mining Act 2006, section 93), dredges are not allowed on the part of the river 
Birim flowing through the concession. However, the miners working on the dredges might 
not have had the state’s approval to mine, they did have the support of the local chief and 
elders. Their acceptance is highly important since, as one respondent puts it; “if the chief says 
‘no’, you cannot mine”. Before starting their operation Key Empire, therefore, had to settle 
two things; they had to obtain the chief’s approval and they had to relocate the dredges. The 
acceptance of the chiefs and elders was established through a significant sum of money – 
meant for community development: building a chief’s palace, a clinic and restoring the 
school buildings. However, removing the dredges from the concession was not all that easy, 
since they had been mining in Ekorso for years and were therefore socially highly embedded. 
Emmanuel elaborated that consequently “the elders of the town stood up for the workers of 
the dredges and so the activities only increased”. Therefore, for the first couple of years after 
licensing the concession, articulations between Key Empire and non-licensed miners were 
troublesome. However, Key Empire eventually was able to successfully cohabit with the 
community and non-licensed miners and the company was able to grow and expand its 
mining activities. At the time of my visit, the company also employed another twenty-six 
people. Three out of the twenty-six were from Ekorso, while the others resided in 
neighboring villages. It was not by choice that Key Empire mostly employed people from 
outside of Ekorso. Emmanuel stated that the miners form Ekorso were familiar with galamsey 
practices, with which you extract gold every day and thus receive money on a daily basis. 
They were therefore a bit hesitant when Key Empire offered them a monthly salary instead. 
Consequently, the available jobs were soon taken by people from outside of Ekorso. They 
took on the positions of all-round workers who are involved in all phases of the extraction 
process, machine operators and security team members. 
 
4.1.3 Mining methods 
In the search of the precious mineral, the most valuable knowledge is where it is allocated in 
the ground. Therefore, before Key Empire could start constructing pits, they first had to 
prospect the land. The aim of prospecting is to get an indication of the amount of gold in the 
sub-soil by digging small pits and washing the gravel (see figure 3). Key Empire asked local 
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people to do the prospecting, for they are the ones mining the land for years and therefore had 
greater geographical knowledge about the gold in the ground. Twenty-five pits were dug on 
the concession, with a depth varying between four and a half to seven meters deep. Since the 
land was un-mined, it was still covered in vegetation. Using heavy machinery such as 
excavators would do a lot of damage to the land; therefore, the pits were dug manually. After 
two to three days of digging they reached the bedrock, which marked the maximum reachable 
depth. Samples were then taken from the three different types of strata encountered: the top-, 
middle soil and bedrock. Theses samples were then washed to get a proper estimate of the 
gold in each three layers of all twenty-five prospecting pits. All together this is quite a time 
consuming undertaking, especially when considered that digging a small pit will only be 
matter of hours when using an excavator. Nonetheless, this process is highly important for its 
result provided the company with the knowledge of where to construct their first pit. 
 Constructing a pit took the excavators around four to five days (see figure 3). The 
depth of the pit depends on where the gravel is located. A pit can thus vary between six to 
nine meters deep. Another three to four days are needed to bring the gravel up to surface 
level. Thus, ideally, the construction of a pit and taking the gravel out would take up to a 
week. However, this is without regarding external factors, such as machinery failure and 
weather circumstances. Key Empire’s machinery, such as the excavators and tipper trucks, 
were quite dated and had the tendency to break down. Depending on what part had to be 
repaired, fixing could take several days. Spare parts had to come from Kumasi, a two-hour 
drive from Ekorso. Moreover, a mechanic had to be called in and brought to the site to repair 
the broken machine. Thus, all in all broken machinery could heavily delay the mining 
process. Furthermore, mining also heavily depended on the weather. Ghana knows two 
seasons: the dry- (December until March) and wet season (April until November). Therefore, 
in March, the last month of my fieldwork, the rainy season was about the take over from the 
dry season. The rain could come in out of nowhere and it could continue to pour for hours. 
For farmers the wet season is great and highly needed, whereas miners dread the rain for it 
means that the pits will fill up with water. When the rain breaks out during the process of 
constructing a new pit and getting the gravel on surface level, they subsequently have to 
pump the water out before being able to continue.  
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Fig. 3.1 (Left) Local miners creating a pit for prospecting on Key Empire’s concession 
Fig 3.2 (Right) Excavators creating a pit and extracting the gravel on Key Empire’s concession (both 
pictures by author) 
 
After the gravel had been taken out of the pit, the company could start with processing or 
washing the gold containing sediment. It took a tipper truck several loads to export the gravel 
from the pit and to heap it near Key Empire’s washing station. The washing area was where 
the gravel was washed so the gold particles can be separated from the soil. Before elaborating 
on further proceedings of Key Empire’s washing methods, a short sidetrack has to be made in 
which the process of gold extraction is elucidated. As mentioned previously, in the case of 
alluvial mining, gold can be found the gravel. Gravel can consist of small gold particles, 
sand, clay and stones. Sometimes gravel clearly differentiates itself from other soil such as 
sand by its color. There are many methods for washing the gravel (using a washing board, 
washing plant or sluice box) but in all cases, having access to water is essential. The washing 
plants are constructed in such a way that the top- is higher than the bottom part so the water 
can run down (see figure 1 for washing plant, see figure 2 and 4 for sluice box). Additionally, 
washing plants contain ‘blankets’. Since gold is heavier than other soil types that make up the 
gravel, washing the gravel on a form of washing plant enables the gold to sink into the 
blankets, which then contain the precious mineral while the other sediments run down. 
Subsequently the blankets are taken out of the washing plant and washed manually. After 
disposing most of the sand and stones, the residual is a concentrated material with a high gold 
density, which most miners at the two visited sites referred to as ‘the black’ due to its color.  
 Key Empire’s washing station was allocated on a permanent place on the concession. 
This can be derived from its concrete floors and the water recycling system – four connected 
large pits enabling water to flow through before flowing back into the river Birim – created 
surrounding the washing area. Key Empire’s washing station characterized itself by the 
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machinery surrounding the cement platform. Next to the platform they had placed a so-called 
‘tromel’ (see figure 4).  
 
Fig 4. Tromel at Key Empire’s washing station (Picture by Emmanuel) 
 
Using the tromel was the first stage of Key Empire’s washing method. A tromel is a screened 
cylinder and its purpose is to separate bigger stones and rocks from the gravel. After an 
excavator fills the tromel with gravel, the rotating movement of the cylinder pushes the larger 
stones towards the other side of the tromel where they are deposited in a pit. The smaller 
particles, which contain the gold, pass through the screen and end up in the sluice box. A 
sluice box is not a standard component of a tromel. Key Empire attached a sluice box for it 
makes the gravel easier to wash in the stages to come, which eventually leads a higher 
percentage of recovery and less tailings.5 According to Emmanuel, the estimated percentage 
of tailings lost to the tromel was around 25% while 75% of the gold is recovered.6 However, 
the tromel takes quite some processing time; it may take several weeks to wash the total 
amount of gravel coming from one pit.  
 After the gravel had passed through the tromel and the attached sluice box, the 
washing continued manually. Key Empire’s employees took the blankets from the sluice and 
washed them in a self-constructed metal box filled with water. After washing all the blankets, 
the water was partially taken out and the remaining black in the metal box was shoveled into 
pans. The black was then poured into a self-constructed traditional washing plant (see figure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5. Due to a lack of proper equipment, a reasonable amount of gold is washed away by the water together with 
other sediment. This processed gravel of which the gold has not been extracted is referred to as ‘tailings’.  
6	  This estimation was somewhat confirmed by a manager from another small-scale mining company who stated 
that a tromel recovers around 80% with 20% tailings. 
37	  
	  
1 for traditional washing plant). This stage needed quite some manual labor since the pans 
passed at least four pairs of hands before ending up at the washing plant. At the washing plant 
the black, again, was trapped in the blankets, which received yet another washing. This 
residual went through one more process; a final washing on a washing board. After washing 
the blankets from the washing board, the miners were left with a material with a high gold 
density. They then reached the final state of processing the gravel, which was panning. This 
meant scooping the residual material into a pan to which water and washing powder was 
added. The washing powder made the soil softer and therefore made it easier to separate it 
from the gold particles. By letting the material move through the pan the heavier (gold) 
particles would settle to the bottom while the other materials could be washed off. Finally, 
mercury was added, which enables gold to agglomerate. The end result was a metal colored 
(due to the mercury), egg-sized ball (the size, obviously, depends on the amount of processed 
gravel and the extracted gold).  
 
4.1.4 New purposes for old pits 
The aftermath of mining is an empty pit that, seemingly, no longer serves a purpose since 
excavators have taken most of the gravel out. However, some gravel always remains inside 
the pit. The excavator can reach up to the bedrock but while digging it cannot prevent parts of 
the over bedding, coming from the walls of the pit, falling in. Therefore, already at the stage 
of creating a pit – a percentage of gold is left inside the pit and was not recovered by the 
mining company. According to Emmanuel, extracting the remaining gold would be too 
expensive. The material left in the pit is a mixture of non-valuable soil and a small percentage 
of gold. Therefore, processing that material would cost Key Empire significant amount of 
energy and money while resulting in a minimal gold recovery.  
 As mentioned previously, the articulations between Key Empire and the non-licensed 
miners that mined the land prior to Key Empire had not always been cordial. The non-
licensed miners wanted to mine the area and received full support of Ekorso’s chief and 
elders. Thus, in early 2016, Key Empire decided that instead of reclaiming the mined pits 
straight away, to the let the dredges return to the concession to mine the left-over gravel in 
the old pits which the mining company itself did not extract for the same reason as they did 
not extract the remaining gold from the constructed pits – it would be too expensive. The 
dredges could keep whatever they mined and sell the gold to a buyer of their own choice. 
When I asked Emmanuel why Key Empire did not dredge the old pits itself he stated that it is 
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not the preferred method for the mining company, because it would mean they would have to 
spend money on fuel while it would not generate a significant income. Moreover, extracting 
gold with a dredge takes longer compared to the method Key Empire was currently using. 
Furthermore, this recent arrangement served two important purposes. Since Key Empire was 
not going to mine the remaining gravel itself – letting the dredges in and having them pay a 
percentage of what they extract as entering fee – Key Empire was able to make some money 
out of this agreement. More importantly, it established social stability between the mining 
company, the chief and elders of Ekorso and the non-licensed miners. As Emmanuel states: 
“So putting them in the old pits is the best way forward. Now there is peace. Before this 
solution, there were always problems”. This social project resonates with the case elaborated 
by Luning and Pijpers (forthcoming 2017) concerning large-scale mining company 
Newmont. The large-scale company allowed artisanal miners on their concession for denying 
them access would create serious tensions and might have had an influence on Newmont’s 
social license to operate. However, a question that dawned was whether Key Empire’s 
solution fell within the legal framework. The company namely did not employ the people 
working on the dredges, while the law stipulates that only the person licensed may mine; in 
this case Emmanuel and his company Key Empire. As a response to this question Emmanuel 
stated that he considered the dredgers his ‘subcontractors’, with whom he had ‘verbal 
contracts’. When asked whether this construction is legal he replied by saying that it is “a 
hundred percent legal” since they are his subcontractors, yet he acknowledged that “they 
never tested it in court”. This is a clear example of a licit agreement. Its illicitness derives 
from the fact that when tested in court, it is debatable whether it would be considered as 
‘legal’; yet it is fully condoned by both the license holder, the non-licensed miners and the 
community of Ekorso – elders and chief included. This solution therefore seemed to kill two 
birds with one stone. However, a consequence it brought forth is that the reclamation of the 
land and transferring the ownership rights back to the original landowners was postponed. 
Key Empire is obliged to reclaim the land post-mining – or when their license period runs out 
which is after a maximum of twenty years. Since a small-scale mining company is legally 
allowed to license two concessions at the same time – a sum of maximum fifty acres – they 
are expected to have fully utilized that land within those twenty years. However, while 
staying in Ekorso, I had the opportunity to talk to several concession owners since there were 
many concessions located within a relatively small radius. Therefore, one concession owner 
had let me in on a well-known trick that many concession owners supposedly used. Many 
small-scale companies indeed licensed two concessions but licensed other concessions 
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through subsidiary companies. This licit trick enabled the holding company to have a 
significant amount of land available for them to mine. Since the mine-life of a single pit in 
alluvial small-scale gold mining is relatively short – depending on the method used and 
compared to hard rock mining where the pits are much deeper, causing the mine life of a 
single pit to be years – the small-scale sector is highly migratory (Andrew 2003). It is a 
constant process of creating new pits, digging up the gravel and extracting the gold. 
Therefore, a small-scale company prefers to have several licensed concessions within the 
same area so they can mine a more substantial amount of gold without having to set up 
several different operations. This licit practice had several consequences. The first 
consequence was while it takes quite some time to license an area, concession owners run the 
risk that the licenses of the concessions they started out with expires long before their latest 
acquired licenses run out. This implies that, according to the law, the original landowners can 
re-claim their land. This causes quite some inconveniences for the concession owners. The 
first inconvenience has to do with the (semi) permanent constructions placed on the first 
concessions, such as security checkpoints and washing stations. The mining company ought 
to relocate these constructions and provide the remaining concessions with new 
infrastructure. The second inconvenience is the fact that after reclamation, the landowners 
will restart cultivating the land. Subsequently, parts of what used to be the concession will 
then be utilized by farmers, while miners will occupy neighboring parts of the land. This 
brings forth safety risks for both parties. Not to say Key Empire takes advantage of the 
implicitness of the law by licensing more than two concessions through subsidiary 
companies, but Emmanuel did elaborate on a contract he wrote up for the landowners that he 
either compensated or was going to compensate. The contract stated that the landowners 
agreed to Key Empire utilizing the land for some years after the land had been mined and 
reclaimed. Therewith, Emmanuel elaborated, Key Empire established that they did not have 
to return the land to the previous landowners immediately post-mining for reasons mentioned 
above. However, this illicit agreement did leaves landowners without an inkling with regard 
to the time-frame after which they could expect to restart cultivating their land plots. After 
talking to several landowners, what stood out is that there seemed to be incongruence 
regarding the exact definition of ‘post-mining’. Most landowners stated that Key Empire did 
not specify the duration of the mining and reclamation period. They, therefore, expected the 
land to be returned after Key Empire had utilized the land. Landowners had observed how 
Key Empire mined their lands and had finished their mining practices for some years now. 
However, instead of fully reclaiming the land, the company had either reclaimed parts, or 
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they had brought in the dredges. Since there seemed to be little communication and 
transparency from the mining company towards the landowners, the landowners were left 
with many unanswered questions. All the while, Key Empire, as previously mentioned, 
intentionally wanted to hold on to the land plots for a prorogued period. Moreover, as 
Emmanuel explained, the company wanted to create what they called ‘demonstration farms’. 
These farms ought to serve as prove that it is well possible to farm after the land has been 
mined – this as a response to an often heard argument that mining significantly deteriorates 
the quality of the land. Whilst during my fieldwork this idea had yet to be executed but it 
already resulted in another delay of reclaiming and returning certain land plots. Therefore, 
Key Empire’s notion of ‘post-mining’ seemed to differ from how it was understood by the 
landowners; for it included their future plans for the concession, such as enabling the dredges 
to mine on the concession and creating demonstration farms. 
 Thus, analyzing Key Empire’s concession gives interesting insights in several aspects 
of small-scale mining. Firstly, the concession illustrates how the implicitness of the law 
enabled Emmanuel to become an authorizer based on his knowledge about the small-scale 
sector and its legislation. This illustrates how, as Heyman states (2013: 306) “legalization and 
illegalization involve not just official state laws and agencies, but also a wider sweep of 
professional knowledge and disciplinary regimes”. Emmanuel’s position as authorizer and 
the necessity for social stability led to the decision of allowing the dredges to mine. This 
convention illustrates how certain small-scale practices do not directly fit into the (il)legal 
categorization and shows how the notion of licit is a better fit. Moreover, it is important to 
note that this licit practice could only be installed due to the site-specific methodological 
choices. This will be elaborated more thoroughly when comparing these choices and the 
subsequent left-over gravel to those of ATK-mining. Additionally, Key Empire’s concession 
illustrates how licit conventions establish successful forms of cohabitation between different 
small-scale mining actors. Cohabitation, thus, is not merely allotted to large-scale and small-
scale miners but also exists within the small-scale sector. Likewise, do these licit practices 
shape the social interactions between the mining company and landowners, which will be 
further elaborated in chapter five. 
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4.2 ATK-mining 
4.2.1 The company and its concessions 
The CEO of ATK-mining was Anthony. Anthony was often present at the mine-site but also 
regularly traveled around the country. Therefore, Anthony heavily relied on his site-manager, 
Dennis. Dennis lived in Accra but stayed near the concession for a good part of the week. 
Before ATK started their operation in Asamama, the land had not been mined before. Most 
miners were mining the river Birim. However, since the land belonging to the community of 
Asamama is stool-land, they had to meet with the chief and get his permission to mine. The 
money gifted to the community, as Dennis elaborated, was part of the social responsibility of 
the company. It therefore ought to be spent on renovation projects, building schools and 
health clinics or to create boreholes and water pumps. ATK started their mining operation in 
Asamama between 2014 and 2015. Dennis openly stated that ATK had many concessions 
under several subsidiaries; moreover, they licensed around sixty neighboring small-scale 
concessions surrounding Asamama. Thus far they had mined five to ten concessions and 
expect to continue mining for the coming five to ten years.  
The concessions were located near, yet not directly bordering, the community of 
Asamama, for it took a twenty mine stroll through a bushy area to get to the actual mine 
operation. The entrance of the actual mining area was recognizable by the tables filled with 
food and drinks, sold by the women sitting behind them. Generating a small income from 
selling food items at mine-sites is an occupation typically carried out by women (Hinton et al. 
2003; Yakovleva 2006). While Key Empire did not allow food sellers or food stalls at their 
concession because of the dust that could get into the food and because the company feared 
that workers would cluster around the food stalls during working hours, ATK condoned 
women to benefit from this spin-off from their mining operation. Besides food products, 
some women at the site also sold strong alcoholic beverages, packaged in small plastic bags 
and something which miners referred to as ‘snuff’; a type of drug which allegedly relieved 
physical pain. Since they were the only sellers in quite a large radius, the women seemed to 
make a reasonable income from selling their products. However, many women complained 
about miners buying their food under false pretense of paying at the end of the day but who 
never came back to give the women their money. The large number of miners present at the 
site each day made it hard to trace the ones leaving without paying.  
 The reason for the significant number of miners present at ATK’s site lied in the way 
they had organized their operation; allowing it to provide an income to many. The miners 
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could be divided into to type of workers, those officially employed by the mining company, 
and those considered ‘casual workers’. ATK officially employed around thirty people. These 
employees were either machine operators or part of the security team. Their employment 
meant that they were insured in case something happened, and that they received a weekly 
salary. The vast majority of miners working ATK’s concession – the ones washing the gravel 
using the suagum method (see figure 1) – did not work under the same conditions. They 
were, as Dennis called them, the ‘casual workers’. When ATK started their operation in 
Asamama, the word about the work possibilities got out and hailed workers from varying 
regions of Ghana. The company knew they wanted to mine using suagum as their method, 
therefore, the miners seeking ways to earn money came to the site in gangs. These gangs are 
groups of twelve people with one gang-leader. The company accepted gangs through the 
principle of first come, first served. Anyone could come and ask for permission to work as 
long as they were at least 18 years of age. Around twelve to thirteen gangs were accepted to 
come and work on the concession. The suagum miners too received a weekly payment, but 
the amount varied from week to week for they were getting paid based on the amount of gold 
they had extracted. 
 
4.2.2 Mining methods 
As mentioned previously, prior to taking out the gravel, a mining company ought to know 
where the gravel is located in the ground. Therefore, ATK also prospected the land before 
utilizing it. Prospecting was done by an excavator, which dug a small pit. It would dig until 
the gravel was reached, which usually took the machine around twenty minutes. They then 
took samples of the gravel to get an indication of its gold density. Upon the results they 
decided whether constructing a pit was profitable. However, Dennis elaborated while the 
company sometimes knew that there was a significant amount of gold allocated deep in the 
ground, they sometimes preferred to work on a shallower pit first, for it is less expensive to 
construct. By extracting gold from that pit – which is a rather cheap expenditure but 
nonetheless generates an income – the company could accumulate some money before 
investing it creating the deeper pit. This aligns with the idea that mining is a sector in which 
debt plays a prominent role (Panella, 2010) – meaning, inter alia, that a miner or mining 
company always spends money (on equipment, fuel, licenses) before earning it back and 
making a profit by selling the gold. It is therefore a constant consideration regarding the 
sequence of the mining process. 
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 ATK’s pits were constructed in such a way that it was optimal when using the suagum 
method. The pits consisted of several levels (see figure 5). The deepest level being the bottom 
of the pit; marking the maximum depth the excavator could dig before reaching the bedrock. 
Higher up was the platform on which both the gravel was placed which was then washed by 
the suagum workers. Finally, there was the ‘surface-level’ (it was hard to tell what surface 
level was, since most of the site was covered in heaped sand coming from the pits), this was 
where the security and managers of ATK would sit under their red parasols, protected from 
the sun and keeping an eye on the workers.  
 
 
Fig. 5 Pit and suagum gangs at ATK’s concession (picture by author) 
 
Thus, after the excavator created a pit and heaped the gravel onto the platform, the washing 
could take place. As mentioned above, the washing was carried out by around twelve suagum 
gangs. Suagum was done by using a traditional plant, which the gang members had to 
provide themselves. Gangs usually rented the washing plant and it was the gang-leader who 
made sure the washing plant was rented and paid for. ATK provided the water pump, which 
pumped the water from the river Birim onto the washing plant. If gangs provided their own 
pump, the mining company paid them thirty cedi’s a day (between six and seven euro’s). The 
gang members positioned themselves and lined up along the edge of the platform so the water 
coming from the sluice attached to their washing plant can directly flow into the pit. The 
twelve people making up the gang each had their own tasks and responsibility during the 
washing. There were those working the gravel, shoveling it into the pans. Another miner 
made sure that the pans were lifted from the ground and placed onto the head of one of the 
carriers. The task of the carriers was to walk back and forth between the gravel and the 
washing plant; where they deposit the gravel into the plant. Finally, there were those working 
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the washing plant and making sure the gravel passed through the deposit box and sluice 
smoothly. As an observer, initially I was impressed by the almost rhythmical precision of this 
procedure. It looked very organized and everyone involved seemed highly aware of their 
individual task and their responsibility as a gang member. Yet, it did not take long for the 
awareness came regarding the repetitive- and tediousness of the process. After every two 
hours of washing the blankets that covered the sluices of the traditional plant were taken of 
and washed. The residual material, which was contained by the blankets, was kept in a 
several plastic buckets or pans. Since the miners got paid based on the amount of gold they 
extracted, every gang had their own buckets. At the end of the day, the miners washed their 
blankets one final time, cleaned the washing plant and themselves; for they would be covered 
in gravel. They then took the buckets filled with the black to the back of a small building, 
which severed as the on-site office. Behind the building is where the gang-leaders would 
continue with panning to get rid of the non-valuable materials before adding mercury. What 
was left was a combination of mercury and gold. They dissolved the mercury by burning the 
remnant. Whereas Key Empire let the refiner do the burning and melting, the miners working 
at ATK’s concession did the first burning themselves. After the first burning, what was left 
was a golden lump. This golden chunk was presented to ATK, or rather to Dennis, who then 
weighed it and paid the gang leader the corresponding amount of money. The gang leader, in 
his turn, was responsible for dividing the money amongst his gang members. It took around a 
week for the suagum miners to wash the heaped gravel form one pit. This mining method was 
therefore extremely migratory. It was a constant process of creating pits, washing the gravel 
and relocating the washing plants to the next pit.  
 Thus whereas Key Empire had a mainly mechanized operation, ATK choose to have 
their gravel washed manually. Their main argument, as Dennis elaborated, was that it took a 
tromel too long to wash the gravel. Consequently, it took longer before you could sell your 
gold and therewith generate an income. However, the tromel did enable miners to recover 
more gold and create less tailings. But by using the suagum method, ATK ensured itself of a 
rather constant income since “you can wash everyday so you get gold everyday”. Therefore, 
ATK did not mind the tailings that much for they wanted “quick money” which, according to 
Dennis, could only be established by using a traditional plant. Thus, while ATK washed 
every day, Key Empire on average did one washing per month. The company consequently 
could go for weeks in which money had to be spent on fuel, salaries and machinery – while 
no money was coming in. As mentioned previously, mining is a constant game of being in 
debt prior to generating an income (Panella, 2010). Consequently, ATK sometimes waited 
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with creating a deeper pit for it increase expenditures while the washing would continue. Key 
Empire on the contrary sometimes made the choice to put the washing on hold all together. 
This choice was at times motivated by the economic climate in Ghana and drops in the gold 
price. Since Key Empire only sold their gold once in a while, they would rather wait for the 
gold price to be acceptable. Both mining companies thus had their own motives and time-
schedules by which they maneuvered through their debts and incomes. A final advantage of 
using the suagum method is the fact it creates employment. While Key Empire employed 
around thirty people, ATK was able to provide employment for over a hundred people. 
However, the word employment often has the connotation of contracted jobs with a set 
income. This is not the type of employment provided by ATK. Questions therefore dawned 
about the implications and consequences this type of employment had for the gang members 
and the circumstances they worked under. It was only right to ask a miner himself. 
 
4.2.3 The story of a miner  
Gospel, a man in his late twenties, lived in Asamama, the region he was raised and where he 
had gone to school. After Secondary School his grades were good enough for University but 
due to a lack of money he could not attend. He went to Senior High School instead where he 
became a visual art student. He specialized in weaving which, while he was twenty-two, 
landed him a scholarship to study abroad in London for six months. It was his first time in 
Europe but he already made such a good impression that they said they would offer him a job 
if he would stay in London. However, his teacher back in Ghana told him he had to return to 
finish his education first. By the time he had graduated, however, the school was not able to 
send him back to England, thus he never returned. He found himself educated, yet 
unemployed. It was one of the sisters of his mother who first got him introduced to mining, at 
the age of twenty-four. Since it generated a reasonable income he continued mining for three 
years. After three years he made up his mind about the next step and decided to join the 
police. In order to do so he had to fill out application forms for which he had to pay a 
significant amount of money. However, after his application, the government put a hold on 
the applications and told people to re-submit the following year. Two years later he submitted 
an application for the military but they did not accept him. Upon this disappointment he 
decided to start mining again. After a couple of months of mining, there were no more job 
possibilities at the site so Gospel had to return to the city he grew up and move back in with 
his mother. He lived there for some months before an old mining college called him and told 
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him about mining possibilities in Asamama. He decided to go for it and this eventually led 
him to ATK-mining. The money he earns from mining is good, he stated; “when you go, you 
get some money. If you do not go, you will not get any money”. This ‘casual work’, can be 
interpreted as highly unstable and insecure, yet many miners seemed quite content with this 
flexibility.  
 ATK employed quite some security who were on-site for the entire day. This was an 
entire different arrangement from Key Empire’s security; some of who work at the security 
point before entering the actual mining area, while others arrived after the company had 
closed so they can patrol throughout the night. The appearances of both security teams also 
differs greatly. While Key Empire’s security team could be recognized by their orange 
overalls, ATK’s security often wore company t-shirts but they could best be identified by the 
large guns they were carrying. Despite the level of security, Gospel acknowledged not feeling 
too safe while working at the site. The security members bossed the workers around and gave 
many commands. Moreover, the company and security team would not let you have a break, 
Gospel stated. The gang leader was the one deciding whether his gang is taking a break. 
However, due to the way the work was organized, it did not allow for many breaks. Every 
gang worked from the same pile of gravel without obvious boundaries. Consequently, 
tensions could arise when two gangs tried to exploit the same spot and overstepped each 
other’s self-claimed boundaries. This competitiveness obviously stemmed from the fact that 
the miners were getting paid based on the amount of extracted gold. Therefore, since ATK 
did not provide set times in which the miners were able to take a break, allowing your gang to 
have a break would mean that other miners would wash your gravel and subsequently result 
into less income. ATK’s way of managing these tensions – that sometimes even resulted in 
fights – was to let the miners pay for every fight they were involved in. During one of my 
visits to the concession, two neighboring gangs were quarreling and it seemed as if a fight 
was about to break out. When I asked Dennis why he did not send in any security to appease 
the miners, he responded by saying that he would rather let them fight and pay so they will 
learn not to fight at the site. Another reason for ATK to take on firm security measures was 
because of the reoccurring issue of miners stealing the black. Gospel explained the tricks that 
allowed him and his gang to steal the black. Sometimes, at the end of the day they would 
have a total of six pans of black, which they had to carry to the office for the final panning 
and first burning. However, by the time the some of the gang members reached the office, 
three pans had disappeared. The other three pans had been smuggled away by other gang 
members. Another well-known trick was to scrape your hand over the blanket while washing 
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the gravel and directly inserting it into your boot. The final trick Gospel had let me in on was 
that they from time to time cover the blanket with another, smaller, blanket that would thus 
hold the gold. They would roll up the smaller blanket and hide it way in their boots while 
they would wash the original blanket on the site. These practices were no secret to Dennis 
and ATK, therefore, increase patrols on the platform during the washing of the blankets and 
after closing the day and transporting the black to the office. The miners’ motive to steal the 
black was because they could sell the gold for a higher price than what ATK offered them. 
ATK namely, inter alia, subtracted the fuel expenses. Thus, at times the narrative was told in 
such a way that made ATK seem to suffer from the aggressive and immoral behavior of the 
miners that could only be prevented and resolved by employing more security. However, 
having the gavel washed by several suagum gangs who work the same gravel while getting 
paid based on what they extract subsequently means results into increasing the level of 
security. It therefore has to be acknowledged that hiring more security is inherent to the 
methodological choices the company had made. 
  
4.2.4 Cohabitation through residual gravel 
ATK’s method of choice for mining gold and the accompanying technology resulted in quite 
some tailings and left-over gravel. Compared to Key Empire’s tailings, ATK’s tailings were 
much more substantial since additionally to the tailings which were created during the 
construction of the pit, they also produced more tailings because of their mining method. The 
traditional plant was only able to extract a certain percentage of gold7, resulting in a 
significant amount of the mineral to flow back into the pit while washing the gravel. 
Consequently, ATK often re-mined the old pits themselves. Therefore, there were not many 
dredges active on the concession since they could only come in after ATK had re-washed the 
tailings themselves. Moreover, some gravel was left on the platform which did not get 
washed by the suagum miners because of the small quantity and because shoveling it into the 
pan would result in a mixture containing mostly sand. This left-over gravel was mined by a 
method locally referred to as ‘kuli kuli’ (see figure 6). Kuli kuli was a mining method 
characterized by manual labor and rudimentary equipment, such as small washing boards, 
shovels, pans and buckets. Most kuli kuli miners I encountered worked in pairs in which one 
collected the leftover gravel in a bucket and deposit it on the washing board while the other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Respondents’ answers on the average percentage of gold extracted by a traditional plant varied between 40 – 
70%  
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would do the actual washing. Since kuli kuli demanded little equipment, it required little 
starting capital and is, therefore, an affair which is rather accessible to many people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Kuli kuli miners on a non-licensed mine-site near Akyem Adukrom (photo by author) 
 
Many respondents considered mining to be an affair mainly suited for men since it is 
physically very strenuous. However, women working as kuli kuli seemed socially rather 
accepted since it was highly noticeable most kuli kuli miners at ATK’s concession were 
women, while there was only one woman doing suagum. The kuli kuli miners at ATK’s 
concession were allowed to mine after the suagum miners had finished washing the entire 
load of gravel. It took the suagum miners several days to wash the gravel, thus in the 
meantime you could either find the kuli kuli miners in the old pits with shallow water mining 
the tailings, or they would hang around the pit the suagum miners were mining. They would 
rather wait for the suagum miners to finish, for this gave them access to ‘fresh gold’, since 
the gravel would not be as mixed with other sediments as the gravel on the bottom of an old 
pit. One of the most important differences between the suagum and kuli kuli miners was that, 
while they were both not officially employed by ATK, the gold the suagum miners extracted 
belonged to ATK and they were obliged to sell it to the mining company, but the kuli kuli 
miners did not work by the same agreement. Whatever they mined, they could keep 
themselves and sell to a buyer by choice. Thus, kuli kuli was not a washing method used by 
ATK’s operation. Anthony briefly elaborated why he did allow kuli kuli practices on ATK’s 
concession. He felt that, since most kuli kuli were women, the small money they earned by 
kuli kuli would be invested into their children. Moreover, they are no threat to ATK’s profit 
for they are only able tot extract a couple grams each time they mine. Emmanuel stated that 
Key Empire did not allow kuli kuli for it was considered to be too much of a risk with the 
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machines at work and with the possible danger of walls of pits collapsing. An important 
remark is that if Key Empire would allow kuli kuli activities on their site, they would only be 
able to mine the tailings in the old pits which is more hazardous than mining the left-over 
gravel on ATK’s platform.   
Thus, studying ATK’s site and comparing it to Key Empire’s concession proves some 
highly interesting insights. Firstly, this comparison illustrates the great diversity in 
manifestations of small-scale mining practices, which aligns with the argument made by 
Ferring et al. (2016) regarding the heterogeneity of sector. Additionally, the practices on both 
mine-sites allow for elaboration on the notions legal- and illegality for several reasons. 
Firstly, while they are useful tools in analyzing a mining context, we should be wary with 
being too fixated on these binary categories for it might lead to missing out on interesting 
nuances. Key Empire illustrates this by their licit conventions on allowing the dredges as sub-
contractors, their conventions regarding post-mining practices and the agreements with the 
landowners on returning the land. ATK exemplifies this issue while it is not unambiguous 
whether the company’s decision of letting the suagum miners wash their gravel falls within 
the legal framework. The law namely stipulates that only the person licensed may win, mine 
and produce minerals (Minerals and Mining Act 2006: section 93), however it does not 
further specify how these minerals ought to be mined. Therefore, due to the implicitness of 
the law, it is not equivocal whether this practice can be considered either completely legal or 
illegal. Using ‘licit’ when describing the practice would thus be better fitting. Another 
example of licitness on ATK’s mine-site is the presence of kuli kuli miners mining the 
company’s tailings in the old pits and the left-over gravel on the platform. When analyzing 
this practice through the lens of (il)legality as it is produces by the law, two arguments can be 
made. The practice could be considered illegal since the kuli kuli miners are not officially 
employed by ATK. Moreover, it can hardly be stated that kuli kuli can be seen as a part of 
ATK’s washing method for the kuli kuli miners do not sell their extracted gold to the mining 
company. At the same time, labeling them as ‘illegal miners’ would not do their situation 
justice since they work on a licensed concession with complete consensus of the license 
holder. The (il)legal categorization thus does not suffice and employing licitness would be a 
better fit. Moreover, sticking with the notions of (il)legality enhances the risk of missing out 
on certain important nuances of small-scale mining practices, such as elucidated above. 
Additionally, analyzing licit practices depicts how cohabitation forms are not merely allotted 
to large-scale companies with encroaching small-scale miners but also exists within different 
small-scale miners. Key Empire established manageable cohabitation between the mining 
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company and the dredges. ATK’s operation also exemplifies how different type small-scale 
miners can cohabit the same concession by allowing the kuli kuli miners to mine their tailings 
and left-over gravel. Both cohabitation forms came into existence due to the residual gravel 
on the concession, caused by the used technology to wash the gravel. This resonates with the 
study by Luning and Pijpers (forthcoming 2017) in which they illustrate how geological 
situations shape interactions between miners and affect the arrangements of cohabitation. 
Lastly, both sites clearly demonstrate how mining sites are “made through the unique 
interrelations of geology, customary and state land tenure policies (including tensions 
between them), miner knowledge, uneven access to technology and many more factors and 
objects” (Ferring et al. 2016: 171). 
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5. Compensate to cohabitate 
The relationship between agriculture and goldmining has been subject to many studies. 
Scholars have addressed how the economic climate in Ghana combined with the seasonality 
of farming has drawn farmers to the mining sector (Hilson and Garforth 2012; Hilson and 
Potter 2003, Hinton et al. 2003). Others have illustrated how mining activities caused the 
dislocation of many farmers (Hilson and Banchirigah 2009; Hilson and Potter 2005). Another 
interesting facet of this intertwined relationship is what happens when a mining company 
licenses a plot of land within a farming community. The present chapter will elaborate on this 
relationship by firstly discussing farming in the locality of Ekorso. Secondly, this chapter will 
elaborate on the compensation schemes used by Key Empire, based on the case of Ekorso’s 
queenmother. This situation will be analyzed in the light of Li’s (2003) study on ‘the logics 
of equivalence’; the establishment of what matters can be monetarily compensated and the 
logics which are used to make that decisions.  
 
5.1 Agriculture in Ekorso 
Agriculture has a long history in Ekorso. Most landownership is acquired through inheritance 
which brings forth family land that has been cultivated by the same families for generations. 
Land owners either manage the land themselves together with relatives, or have farmers 
cultivating the land for them. The farmland of Ekorso yields various crops such as yam, 
cassava, maize, plantain and okra. However, many farmers mostly cultivate the cash-crop 
cacao. Starting a cacao farm is a relative long term investment for it takes three to five years 
before the tree starts bearing fruit and becomes profitable. When the cacao tree is fully 
grown, it can be harvested twice a year; during the main crop-season (September until 
March) and the mid-crop season (May until August). The main crop-season accounts for the 
largest harvest8 and for this reason, most farmers in Ekorso mainly harvest during the main-
crop season. This implies that farmers have to work the land for a substantial period before 
they can profit from the revenues. Nevertheless, cacao trees are ubiquitous and the main cash-
crop in Ekorso and its vicinity. For many miners and farmers, the relation between cacao and 
gold was evident since cacao allegedly was an indicator of gold in the ground. Therefore, 
many landowners had experienced firsthand what the presence of gold within the subsoil 
could mean for them as landowners.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 http://www.icco.org/faq/58-cocoa-harvesting/131-what-time-of-year-is-cocoa-harvested.html 
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 To reiterate, the Mining law (2006) states that a spatially bound license is granted by 
the state to the licensee. This license enables the licensee to mine a demarcated area for an 
initial five years. The original landowners have to temporarily transfer their ownership and 
user rights to the licensee and in exchange they will receive an amount to compensate for the 
use of the land and the destruction of the crops. ‘Using the land’ and ‘destructing crops’ are 
rather wide concept and leave plenty space for personal interpretations. Consequently, since 
the law authorizes the licensee to dictate further proceedings, paying compensation is a 
process filled with personal conventions and discrepancy about highly important matters, 
such as what can be compensated and how to decide on the equivalence of these matters. 
During my fieldwork, I spoke with many landowners and farmers who elaborated on the 
issues they encountered with receiving compensation by Key Empire. One of the landowners 
was the queenmother of Ekorso. Following her situation will be elucidated. Her situation 
illustrates how the implicitness of the law gives room for hybrid governors to rise to the 
occasion and implement their own conventions and compensation schemes.  
 
5.2 The story of a landowner 
An organized meeting with several farmers and landowners of Ekorso allowed me to talk to 
them more thoroughly on matters such as land ownership and compensation. All of those 
present had owned land, which was now part of Key Empire’s concession and had therefore 
been compensated. After hearing many different stories of various landowners, the 
queenmother of Ekorso showed up to elaborate on her story. The queenmother is the senior 
woman of the community and has accompanying political and social responsibilities. She is 
considered to be the female co-ruler of the community. The present queenmother, however, 
was not traditionally chosen but she was upholding the position until they would be able to 
rightfully replace late queenmother. Nevertheless, everyone in the community would always 
refer to her as queenmother. Besides occupying this traditional position, she also owned a 
piece of land in Ekorso. The following is her story, combined with information drawn from 
several conversations with Emmanuel in which we discussed the matter. 
The queenmother of Ekorso owned a total of seven acres of land allocated within Key 
Empire’s concession. She did not cultivate the land herself but rather had a farmer cultivating 
the land for her. There had been some negotiations between the her and Emmanuel 
considering temporarily transferring the ownership rights of parts of her land to the mining 
company. However, over time the once cordial relationship between Emmanuel and the 
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queenmother changed, leaving the queenmother feeling reluctant to sell her land to Key 
Empire. Not much later, the queenmother found out that Key Empire had been mining an 
area allocated on the border of her land and a plot of land owned by someone else. The over 
bedding dug up by the excavator, had been placed on the queenmother’s land. According to 
Emmanuel the company had made the decision to heap the over bedding on that place since 
there was no other possibility for them to place it elsewhere. After the queenmother heard 
about the situation from the farmer cultivating her land, she invited Emmanuel over to meet 
with her and discuss the matter. Emmanuel stated that during that meeting both parties agreed 
upon the size of the land of which the ownership rights would temporarily would be 
transferred to Key Empire. Additionally, they also agreed on the amount of compensation 
money. These negotiations allegedly took place somewhere between May and June in 2015. 
Key Empire, according to the queenmother, was supposed to have paid the compensation by 
October that year, yet during my stay in Ekorso she still had not received any money. 
Moreover, two months prior to her appearance at the meeting I organized, Key Empire had 
started constructing a road passing straight through part of her land. When discussing the 
matter with Emmanuel, he elaborated on the difficulties he had encountered after heaping the 
over bedding on this specific piece of land. He stated that during his visit to the 
queenmother’s house where they agreed upon the compensation height, she requested to have 
the entire sum of money straight away. According to Emmanuel, he told her that Key Empire 
was not able to supply her with the entire amount yet, but that they will pay as soon as they 
start mining her land. Taking the pace at which they were working at that time into 
consideration; Emmanuel offered to pay by December of last year. However, before being 
able to follow up on this agreement, another issue arose. The farmer whose land bordered that 
of the queenmother’s made the allegation that the assumed borders were not the actual 
borders. This claim led to it being questionable whether the queenmother was the actual 
owner of the land on which the over bedding had been placed. Consequently, the next step 
would have been to let surveyors in to verify the boundaries after which compensation could 
be paid to the rightful landowners. During my stay, they had agreed upon a date but 
eventually the queenmother was not able to attend, therefore the appointment had to be 
rescheduled.  
To reiterate, there were several issues between the queenmother and Key Empire. 
Firstly, the queen mother took offence of the mining company started using her plot of land 
without her knowledge or consent. Secondly, she claimed to have contacted Emmanuel about 
this matter and asked him to stop the company’s activities but this did not prevent the 
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company from constructing a road on her land. Lastly she had not yet received any 
compensation for the land which was being exploited by the mining company. This story 
stood out from the ones told by other landowners, since it initially seemed as if was a 
completely different scenario. Where most landowners had already received compensation 
but were not satisfied with the amount, the queen mother did not seem to complain about the 
height but rather the criticized the time-period in which the compensation had to be paid. 
However, when scrutinizing the cases more closely, ultimately most predicaments seemed to 
have arosen due to personal interpretations regarding what can be compensated. To elucidate 
the matter, it is necessary to have another look at the legislation. By granting a mining 
license, the state authorizes a person to mine a demarcated area. Therewith, the licensee thus 
obtained temporal rights to the sub-soil, which ordinarily belongs to the state, for the entire 
duration of the license period. Since this licensing process often creates conflicting ownership 
claims regarding the land plots allocated within the concession, the licensee is lawfully 
obliged to pay compensation (Minerals and Mining Act 2006: section 94). This compensation 
ought to be paid for two aspects: the use of the land and the destruction of the crops. These 
two aspects both hold interesting implications. Firstly, compensating for using the land 
implies that the license only transfers temporal rights of using the land and do not establish a 
definitive transfer of property rights. This argument is obviously supported by the fact that a 
license has a certain duration after which it is no longer valid. Secondly, the law stipulates 
that the licensee should compensate for the destruction of the crops but does not further 
specify what this exactly entails. After planting crops, it takes a while before they can be 
harvested. Therefore, what the crop might be worth at the time of destruction differs from 
what the revenues might have been after harvesting. The law does not provide any guidelines 
as to how to assess the matter. Hence, this case allows us to further study how people in a 
mining context settle such issues when the accompanying legislation remains implicit.  
Before further analyzing the context, it is highly important to recognize and elaborate 
on Emmanuel’s position compared to the position of the landowners. As became clear in 
chapter four; Emmanuel was able to study at University level and is therefore highly 
educated. When entering the small-scale mining sector, he got himself informed so became 
rather knowledgeable on mining issues such as its legislation. Additionally, he had a social 
network which also enabled him to get well-informed – such as his acquaintances at the 
Minerals Commission. His knowledge about mining legislation, -practices and business 
combined with his license which gave him the authorization over the sub-soil, enables him to 
position himself as a hybrid governor. As Li (2013) has clearly illustrated, compensation is a 
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matter of deciding on equivalences; how things are made comparable and exchangeable 
based on forms of quantification and standardization. Moreover, Li uses the notion of 
equivalence to refer to two different yet related processes. Firstly, equivalence may refer to 
the scientific and technical tools which are used to make matters quantifiable and 
comparable. Secondly, equivalence can be a political relationship characterized by an 
ongoing negotiation concerning what counts as authoritative knowledge. She illustrates the 
latter in a case concerning a large-scale mining whose operation might have great 
environmental and social effects. Therefore, peasant farmers, agriculturalists, 
environmentalists and other critics found themselves in a constant struggle over who had the 
authoritative knowledge. This issue might have also arisen in Ekorso, were it not that in this 
context there was only one person who was considered most knowledgeable. This hierarchy 
of knowledge and authority in which Emmanuel was on top, established him as the main 
information provider. This resulted into him being able to capitalize on the implicitness of the 
law by implanting his own conventions and compensation schemes. This can be exemplified 
by the case of the queenmother. The law stipulating that the land use has to be compensated 
can be widely interpreted. For licensee this might entail that they have to pay when they start 
utilizing the land. However, landowners often obtained the plot of land through inheritance 
and viewed cultivating the land as a long-term investment, for it is something they can pass 
on to their children. One respondent explained that his land was originally owned by his late 
father but now him and his siblings were cultivating the land. Land therefore can have the 
same semantic as Li encountered for water in a locality on the border of Chile and Argentina. 
She stated that “the canal binds people through kinship ties as water rights passed from 
parents to children, and it is also a crucial element of community membership, since it 
requires users to fulfill certain obligations related to the maintenance and administration of 
the canal” (2013: 23). Thus, while the law makes it seem as if the land is easily quantifiable 
and commensurable with money, it can never really be standardized and therefore 
compensation payments are never truly equivalent. Additionally, the law not further 
specifying ‘land use’ increases incongruence between the licensee and landowners. As the 
queenmother pointed out, her issues started when Key Empire stated to heap the over bedding 
on parts of her land plot. To her, this indicated that the company had used her land for mining 
related activities and consequently she wanted to be compensated. However, the mining 
company did not share that perception. Emmanuel stated that the company was definitely 
going to pay her but not until their mining activities would have reached her land. Merely 
heaping the over bedding – according to Emmanuel a solution born out of necessity – was not 
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regarded as a form of ‘using the land’. Therefore, paying compensation could be postponed. 
This compensation scheme had great economic benefits for the mining company. Within the 
mining sector, revenues are only yielded when selling the extracted gold, while the mining 
activities preceding selling the gold (prospecting, constructing pits, paying compensation) 
merely in debt a mining company. Consequently, postponing paying compensation allowed 
Key Empire to invest their thus far accumulated money into other matters so compensation 
can be paid later from the yielded revenues. This intertwined relationship between mining 
and debts has been addressed by Panella (2010) who used the concept ‘world of debt’ to 
describe the gold mining sector since “debt relations are (…) of a crucial importance in order 
to interpret the micro-dynamics on a mining site” (Panella 2010: 5). The fact that the law 
does not lay down a time-frame in which the compensation ought to be paid enlarges the 
room for mining companies to play around with the interpretation of the legislation and 
install their own licit conventions. As Emmanuel stated: “we cannot pay every farmer at the 
same time. It has to be gradual and it also hast to be according to the way we mine”. He did 
acknowledge that the queenmother had to be compensated for the road which had been 
constructed on her land. However, he added that by constructing the road the company had 
not destroyed or destructed any crops they had been cultivating, since the maize had already 
been harvested while the cacao trees were not ready to be harvested yet. This remark brings 
us to the second stipulation of the law: compensating for the destruction of the crops. 
Since compensation ought the be paid for the loss of crops, the legislation could have 
incorporated set amounts for different types of crops. However, the law neither provides such 
an overview, nor does it refer to a government body that offers specifications regarding 
values of crops. Upon asking Emmanuel about the existence of such an authority he 
mentioned the ‘Valuation Board’, a board of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. 
They, according to their website, are responsible for advising on “all land-property valuations 
for rental, capital, rating and compensation purposes”.9 Emmanuel stated the company would 
only mention the Valuation Board if the negotiations became too difficult. However, none of 
the landowners Key Empire had compensated thus far had decided to get the Valuation Board 
involved. The reason being, according to Emmanuel, that Key Empire always offered a 
higher amount than the Valuation Board. Moreover, the room for negotiations which 
subsequently existed seemed to be highly appreciated by the company. This aligns with one 
of Li’s findings, namely that “compensation agreements allow companies to negotiate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 https://www.newsghana.com.gh/minerals-commission-debunks-gnassm-claims-over-issuance-of-licences/ 
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directly with communities, making it more difficult for (…) government agencies to block a 
project’s approval” (2013: 30). Since in Ekorso, Emmanuel was most knowledgeable on 
these issues regarding legislation and government bodies, most landowners got their 
information from him. It is therefore questionable whether landowners even were fully aware 
of the existence of the Valuation Board and if so, whether they have ever verified if the 
amounts offered by Key Empire are indeed higher than what the Valuation Board would 
recommend. Due to the implicitness of the law and subsequently Emmanuel’s position as 
authorizer enabled him to base his conventions on his personal interpretation and likings of 
the law. When elaborating on paying compensation for destructing the crops on the 
queenmother’s land he stated the following: 
 
The cacao which was there, is a very small cacao (…) And so as we speak we have not really 
caused any damage, in terms of income to her. If for instance if they are supposed to harvest 
the cacao [that is on the land now], it is going to take them like a year or a year and a half 
before they can harvest it. 
 
This statement illustrates how his interpretation equates ‘loss of crop’ with ‘loss of income’. 
This equation enables the mining company to take several nuances into consideration when 
deciding upon compensation; such as the maturity of the plants, the period until they would 
have been harvested and when, subsequently, the loss of income would have been suffered. 
Emmanuel stated: 
 
So that for instance if I happen to be in the middle of two farmers and one farmer has cacao 
that he or she is going to harvest [in] a year and then there is another farmer who is harvesting 
it now. I will pay the farmer who is harvesting it now, because he is earning a certain income 
from it, but the [other one] is not. I will probably postpone [paying the compensation] for 
about five months or maybe six months or eight months or something. Because I know that it 
will not affect her income or his income in any way. 
 
The important difference between ‘loss of crops’ and ‘loss of income’ lies in the fact that 
‘loss of income’ allows mining companies to play around with temporality: deciding on the 
sequence of mining activities. Due to the implicitness of the law, they can install their own 
licit conventions which are based on, and serve, the timing of the company. What the case of 
the queenmother makes clear is that both landowners and mining companies highly value 
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temporality, but it expressed itself in different ways. Many respondents that were landowners 
expressed feeling cheated by the mining company since they had started utilizing the land 
before paying compensation. At the same time, the licensee has to consider the different 
expenses of the operation. The mining company constantly finds itself in between 
indebtedness and having revenues which are partly used to pay off certain debts, partly to 
invest and partly mere profit. As Li (2013) illustrated, a substantial part of compensation 
agreements and deciding on equivalence is based on calculations. However, the involved 
parties often have different views on what these calculations should entail. Since the 
legislation does not provide any further guidelines, the licensee can step in as an authorizer 
and implement his own licit conventions based on his knowledgeability. The landowners 
often follow his lead in the compensation schemes due to the knowledge gap. Thus, what this 
case illustrates is how the implicitness of the law, combined with the fact that the gold mining 
sector is a world characterized by indebtedness (Panella 2010) causes compensation schemes 
produced by mining companies. Producing these compensation schemes are possible due to 
temporality since temporality structures what is considered acceptable as equivalent to the 
land the landowners have to temporarily transfer to the mining company. Consequently, these 
compensation schemes shape the social structures between the actors involved and while 
these compensation agreements can “resolve disputes” they can “also lead to the 
multiplication of conflicts” (Li 2013:26).  
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6. Conclusion 
The study presented in this thesis problematized the constructs of ‘small-scale’ and 
‘(il)legality’. It firstly addressed the notion of ‘small-scale’. The Ghanaian mining law 
established the requirements for a concession to be small-scale: the concessions can 
maximally consist of 25 acres. Scholars have added to this categorization by creating 
different typologies based on ethnographic fieldwork. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in 
two different localities, this thesis analyzed two small-scale mining operations allocated 
within a five-kilometer span. This analysis showed how the two small-scale operations use 
different mining methods to extract the gold from the ground. Where Key Empire in Ekorso 
used a tromel to wash the gold containing gravel and consequently employed under thirty 
workers, ATK in Asamama used the suagum method which they outsourced to around 150 
so-called casual workers. Juxtaposing these two mining operations resonates with the 
argument made by Ferring et al. (2016), namely that the sector is much more heterogeneous 
than the generalized characteristics dictated to the sector, such as low technology and 
mechanization, labor intensive, low capital investment and high risk (2016: 173), seem to 
imply. Ferring et al. therefore emphasize the need for an opening up of the conceptualizations 
of small-scale mining. These conceptualizations they refer toare inevitable and helpful, 
however, there is a risk of missing important nuances when merely focusing on these 
conceptualizations and generalizations. Along those lines, conceptualizations may make 
scales seem irrevocable – notions which unquestionably and unchangeably exist within the 
world. However, as Tsing (2000) argues, scales are created and produced. Moreover, she 
states, this process should be brought up for discussion so the details of scale-making can be 
scrutinized. The two different small-scale mining operations in two nearby communities that 
were studied during my fieldwork period vary greatly and thus illustrate how challenging it 
can be to create a fitting typology for the sector. Moreover, during my stay, both operations 
kept changing and evolving; using new equipment, trying different techniques and adjusting 
their mining ways to increase their efficiency – showing how practices of small-scale mining 
are ever-changing.  
 Furthermore, this thesis illustrated how opening up the conceptualizations of small-
scale mining makes us susceptible to nuances within the sector. Not being completely guided 
by pre-defined typologies of what small-scale might be, made it possible to studying both 
concessions with an open vision, resulting in analyzing different mining manifestations 
occurring within the same small-scale concession. Key Empire allowed dredges to work in 
the old pits where they extracted the gravel from the bottom and walls of the pit. These 
60	  
	  
workers were not employed by the mining company but considered ‘sub-contractors’. The 
agreement they had with Key Empire was that they ought to pay a daily fee to the company, 
but they could keep their gold revenues. ATK also allowed other miners to extract gold from 
the left-over gravel they had dug up. These kuli kuli miners would collect the remaining 
gravel on the platform which had not been processed by the suagum workers. Since the 
revenues of the kuli kuli miners were rather small, they did not have to pay a fee nor were 
they by any means mining in name of the company. Most studies addressing articulations 
within the mining sectors have focused on cohabitation on large-scale concessions between a 
large-scale company and small-scale operators (Hilson 2002b; Luning and Pijpers 
forthcoming 2017; Teschner 2013) mining either with or without full consent of the license 
owner. However, this thesis illustrates how cohabitation also exists within the small-scale 
sector and between different small-scale actors.  
 What the present study additionally argues is how the heterogeneity of small-scale 
mining and the cohabitation forms within the sector can (continue to) exist due to the 
implicitness of the law. The Minerals and Mining Act (2006) has effect both through its 
specifications and its silences. The specifications shape the sector, while the silences leave 
room for hybrid governors to come in and (re)install their own conventions. Thus far, 
scholars have mainly addressed the implementation of conventions by either state-, 
traditional- or political authorities (Geenen 2016; Hentschel et al. 2002; Hilson 2001; Luning 
and Pijpers forthcoming 2017), therefore, the added value of the current study lies in the 
finding that individuals can also become hybrid governors through their knowledgeability. 
The concession owners of both mine-sites studied capitalized on the fact that the law does 
exhaustively specify issues such as mining methods and the payment of compensation. They 
were therefore able to implement their own conventions. Conventions such as owning more 
than two concessions under subsidiary companies, allowing the dredges on the concession 
and considering them as sub-contractors or enabling the kuli kuli miners to profit from the 
revenues they made by processing the left-over gravel. These conventions, however, do not 
necessarily fit within the legal framework, yet are fully condoned by the parties involved. 
Therefore, this thesis argues, that the notion of ‘licitness’ (cf. Abraham and van Schendel 
2005) is better suited. These licit conventions by hybrid governors are highly important for 
they structure cohabitation forms – cohabitation forms as elucidated; between their company 
and other small-scale miners and cohabitation forms between their company and landowners. 
Since there is a highly intertwined relationship between gold mining and agriculture, 
articulations between landowners and miners are inevitable. Therefore, the law structures this 
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relationship by obliging the mining companies to pay compensation, yet at the same time, it 
is implicit about many aspects of the actual payment. Consequently, discussing what matters 
can be compensated and their monetary equivalent is left up to the licensee and the 
landowner. Li (2013) states that part of these compensation agreements depend on 
calculations. Since the licensee are often most knowledgeable, their calculations will 
predominantly be used in deciding on compensation. Additionally, the equivalent on which 
the compensation-schemes are stooled cannot be fully understood without the notion of 
temporality: the order in which the mining related activities are carried out. One of the 
aspects of compensation, which the case of the queenmother exemplified, is how interpreting 
‘destruction of the crops’ as ‘loss of income’ allows for compensation-schemes which based 
themselves on when the loss of income will be suffered. This resulted into different 
landowners getting compensated at different times. The case therefore illustrated how 
temporality shapes social contacts and structures what is considered acceptable as equivalent. 
 Thus, by studying the practice of small-scale mining on two localities, this thesis 
illustrates the heterogeneity of the sector with its wide variety of methodologies and its 
fascinating licit conventions. The most important argument of the present study is while 
conceptualizations, categorizations and typologies are inevitable and useful, it should always 
be acknowledged that they are produced. With this acknowledgement it is recognized that the 
matters which are being defined are subject to change. Without this acknowledgement we as 
anthropologists are running the risk of missing out important and interesting nuances such as 
the cohabitation forms within small-scale miners or the licit conventions of hybrid governors. 
Such matters could be overlooked if we would analyze small-scale as a pre-defined sector 
with merely legal and illegal actors and state regulation. Moreover, being susceptible to such 
nuances not only does the small-scale mining sector more justice, it additionally opens up 
fascinating new anthropological research objects.  
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